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Media attention and strategic timing in politics: Evidence from U.S. presidential executive orders

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Media attention and strategic timing in politics: Evidence from U.S. presidential executive orders. / Djourelova, Milena; Durante, Ruben.
In: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 66, No. 4, 31.10.2022, p. 813-834.

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Djourelova M, Durante R. Media attention and strategic timing in politics: Evidence from U.S. presidential executive orders. American Journal of Political Science. 2022 Oct 31;66(4):813-834. Epub 2021 Dec 29. doi: 10.1111/ajps.12683

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Djourelova, Milena ; Durante, Ruben. / Media attention and strategic timing in politics : Evidence from U.S. presidential executive orders. In: American Journal of Political Science. 2022 ; Vol. 66, No. 4. pp. 813-834.

Bibtex

@article{94c6db89087844039f01d040d72c68e6,
title = "Media attention and strategic timing in politics: Evidence from U.S. presidential executive orders",
abstract = "Do politicians tend to adopt unpopular policies when the media and the public are distracted by other events? We examine this question by analyzing the timing of executive orders signed by U.S. presidents over the past four decades. We find robust evidence that executive orders are more likely to be signed on the eve of days when the news is dominated by other important stories that can crowd out coverage of executive orders. This relationship only holds in periods of divided government when unilateral presidential actions are more likely to be criticized by Congress. The effect is driven by executive orders that are more likely to make the news and to attract negative publicity, particularly those on topics on which president and Congress disagree. Finally, the timing of executive orders appears to be related to predictable news but not unpredictable ones, which suggests it results from a deliberate and forward-looking PR strategy.",
author = "Milena Djourelova and Ruben Durante",
year = "2022",
month = oct,
day = "31",
doi = "10.1111/ajps.12683",
language = "English",
volume = "66",
pages = "813--834",
journal = "American Journal of Political Science",
issn = "0092-5853",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Media attention and strategic timing in politics

T2 - Evidence from U.S. presidential executive orders

AU - Djourelova, Milena

AU - Durante, Ruben

PY - 2022/10/31

Y1 - 2022/10/31

N2 - Do politicians tend to adopt unpopular policies when the media and the public are distracted by other events? We examine this question by analyzing the timing of executive orders signed by U.S. presidents over the past four decades. We find robust evidence that executive orders are more likely to be signed on the eve of days when the news is dominated by other important stories that can crowd out coverage of executive orders. This relationship only holds in periods of divided government when unilateral presidential actions are more likely to be criticized by Congress. The effect is driven by executive orders that are more likely to make the news and to attract negative publicity, particularly those on topics on which president and Congress disagree. Finally, the timing of executive orders appears to be related to predictable news but not unpredictable ones, which suggests it results from a deliberate and forward-looking PR strategy.

AB - Do politicians tend to adopt unpopular policies when the media and the public are distracted by other events? We examine this question by analyzing the timing of executive orders signed by U.S. presidents over the past four decades. We find robust evidence that executive orders are more likely to be signed on the eve of days when the news is dominated by other important stories that can crowd out coverage of executive orders. This relationship only holds in periods of divided government when unilateral presidential actions are more likely to be criticized by Congress. The effect is driven by executive orders that are more likely to make the news and to attract negative publicity, particularly those on topics on which president and Congress disagree. Finally, the timing of executive orders appears to be related to predictable news but not unpredictable ones, which suggests it results from a deliberate and forward-looking PR strategy.

U2 - 10.1111/ajps.12683

DO - 10.1111/ajps.12683

M3 - Journal article

VL - 66

SP - 813

EP - 834

JO - American Journal of Political Science

JF - American Journal of Political Science

SN - 0092-5853

IS - 4

ER -