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    Rights statement: This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in International Journal of Industrial Organization. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in International Journal of Industrial Organization, 70, 2020 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102614

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Metasearch and market concentration

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

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Metasearch and market concentration. / Foucart, Renaud.

In: International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 70, 102614, 01.05.2020.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Foucart, R 2020, 'Metasearch and market concentration', International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 70, 102614. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102614

APA

Foucart, R. (2020). Metasearch and market concentration. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 70, [102614]. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102614

Vancouver

Foucart R. Metasearch and market concentration. International Journal of Industrial Organization. 2020 May 1;70:102614. Epub 2020 Mar 19. doi: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102614

Author

Foucart, Renaud. / Metasearch and market concentration. In: International Journal of Industrial Organization. 2020 ; Vol. 70.

Bibtex

@article{2aff70bbc60448158a3b7cefc705f200,
title = "Metasearch and market concentration",
abstract = "Competing intermediaries search on behalf of consumers among a large number of horizontally differentiated sellers. Consumers either pick the best deal offered by an intermediary, or compare the intermediaries. A higher number of intermediaries has the direct effect of decreasing their search effort. Hence, if an exogenous share of consumers do not compare, more competition hurts them. More competition however also increases the incentives for consumers to compare. A higher share of informed consumers in turn increases the search effort of intermediaries. If consumers are ex-ante identical and rationally choose whether to become informed, the total effect of a higher number of intermediaries is to make each of them (weakly) choosier. Moreover, it always decreases the price offered by sellers. Allowing intermediaries to bias their advice by making sponsored links prominent has a similar effect of making all consumers better off in expectation.",
keywords = "Search, Advice, Competition",
author = "Renaud Foucart",
note = "This is the author{\textquoteright}s version of a work that was accepted for publication in International Journal of Industrial Organization. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in International Journal of Industrial Organization, 70, 2020 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102614",
year = "2020",
month = may,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102614",
language = "English",
volume = "70",
journal = "International Journal of Industrial Organization",
issn = "0167-7187",
publisher = "Elsevier Inc.",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Metasearch and market concentration

AU - Foucart, Renaud

N1 - This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in International Journal of Industrial Organization. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in International Journal of Industrial Organization, 70, 2020 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102614

PY - 2020/5/1

Y1 - 2020/5/1

N2 - Competing intermediaries search on behalf of consumers among a large number of horizontally differentiated sellers. Consumers either pick the best deal offered by an intermediary, or compare the intermediaries. A higher number of intermediaries has the direct effect of decreasing their search effort. Hence, if an exogenous share of consumers do not compare, more competition hurts them. More competition however also increases the incentives for consumers to compare. A higher share of informed consumers in turn increases the search effort of intermediaries. If consumers are ex-ante identical and rationally choose whether to become informed, the total effect of a higher number of intermediaries is to make each of them (weakly) choosier. Moreover, it always decreases the price offered by sellers. Allowing intermediaries to bias their advice by making sponsored links prominent has a similar effect of making all consumers better off in expectation.

AB - Competing intermediaries search on behalf of consumers among a large number of horizontally differentiated sellers. Consumers either pick the best deal offered by an intermediary, or compare the intermediaries. A higher number of intermediaries has the direct effect of decreasing their search effort. Hence, if an exogenous share of consumers do not compare, more competition hurts them. More competition however also increases the incentives for consumers to compare. A higher share of informed consumers in turn increases the search effort of intermediaries. If consumers are ex-ante identical and rationally choose whether to become informed, the total effect of a higher number of intermediaries is to make each of them (weakly) choosier. Moreover, it always decreases the price offered by sellers. Allowing intermediaries to bias their advice by making sponsored links prominent has a similar effect of making all consumers better off in expectation.

KW - Search

KW - Advice

KW - Competition

U2 - 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102614

DO - 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102614

M3 - Journal article

VL - 70

JO - International Journal of Industrial Organization

JF - International Journal of Industrial Organization

SN - 0167-7187

M1 - 102614

ER -