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Mixed oligopoly, sequential entry and spatial price discrimination

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Mixed oligopoly, sequential entry and spatial price discrimination. / Heywood, John; Ye, Guangliang.
In: Economic Inquiry, Vol. 47, No. 3, 07.2009, p. 589-597.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Heywood, J & Ye, G 2009, 'Mixed oligopoly, sequential entry and spatial price discrimination', Economic Inquiry, vol. 47, no. 3, pp. 589-597. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2008.00134.x

APA

Heywood, J., & Ye, G. (2009). Mixed oligopoly, sequential entry and spatial price discrimination. Economic Inquiry, 47(3), 589-597. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2008.00134.x

Vancouver

Heywood J, Ye G. Mixed oligopoly, sequential entry and spatial price discrimination. Economic Inquiry. 2009 Jul;47(3):589-597. doi: 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2008.00134.x

Author

Heywood, John ; Ye, Guangliang. / Mixed oligopoly, sequential entry and spatial price discrimination. In: Economic Inquiry. 2009 ; Vol. 47, No. 3. pp. 589-597.

Bibtex

@article{33fab9ac05a9410599ce3e279086c173,
title = "Mixed oligopoly, sequential entry and spatial price discrimination",
abstract = "This paper is the first to examine the welfare consequences of a public firm in a traditional model of spatial price discrimination. It demonstrates that when a private firm acts as a Stackelberg location leader, the presence of a public firm always improves welfare. Moreover, when three firms locate sequentially, the presence of a public firm improves social welfare unless it locates last. Thus, despite examining a variety of location timings, including simultaneous location, privatization never improves welfare and usually harms welfare. This conclusion differs from several currently in the literature in which privatization often improves welfare.",
author = "John Heywood and Guangliang Ye",
year = "2009",
month = jul,
doi = "10.1111/j.1465-7295.2008.00134.x",
language = "English",
volume = "47",
pages = "589--597",
journal = "Economic Inquiry",
issn = "0095-2583",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Mixed oligopoly, sequential entry and spatial price discrimination

AU - Heywood, John

AU - Ye, Guangliang

PY - 2009/7

Y1 - 2009/7

N2 - This paper is the first to examine the welfare consequences of a public firm in a traditional model of spatial price discrimination. It demonstrates that when a private firm acts as a Stackelberg location leader, the presence of a public firm always improves welfare. Moreover, when three firms locate sequentially, the presence of a public firm improves social welfare unless it locates last. Thus, despite examining a variety of location timings, including simultaneous location, privatization never improves welfare and usually harms welfare. This conclusion differs from several currently in the literature in which privatization often improves welfare.

AB - This paper is the first to examine the welfare consequences of a public firm in a traditional model of spatial price discrimination. It demonstrates that when a private firm acts as a Stackelberg location leader, the presence of a public firm always improves welfare. Moreover, when three firms locate sequentially, the presence of a public firm improves social welfare unless it locates last. Thus, despite examining a variety of location timings, including simultaneous location, privatization never improves welfare and usually harms welfare. This conclusion differs from several currently in the literature in which privatization often improves welfare.

U2 - 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2008.00134.x

DO - 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2008.00134.x

M3 - Journal article

VL - 47

SP - 589

EP - 597

JO - Economic Inquiry

JF - Economic Inquiry

SN - 0095-2583

IS - 3

ER -