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Multi-agent team formation for design problems

Research output: Contribution in Book/Report/Proceedings - With ISBN/ISSNConference contribution/Paperpeer-review

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Multi-agent team formation for design problems. / Soriano Marcolino, Leandro; Xu, Haifeng; Gerber, David J. et al.
Coordination, Organizations, Institutions, and Normes in Agent Systems XI: COIN 2015 International Workshops, COIN@AAMAS, Istanbul, Turkey, May 4, 2015, COIN@IJCAI, Buenos Aires, Argentina, July 26, 2015, Revised Selected Papers. ed. / Virginia Dignum; Pablo Noriega; Murat Sensoy; Jaime Simão Sichman. Springer, 2016. p. 354-375 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Vol. 9628).

Research output: Contribution in Book/Report/Proceedings - With ISBN/ISSNConference contribution/Paperpeer-review

Harvard

Soriano Marcolino, L, Xu, H, Gerber, DJ, Kolev, B, Price, S, Pantazis, E & Tambe, M 2016, Multi-agent team formation for design problems. in V Dignum, P Noriega, M Sensoy & JS Sichman (eds), Coordination, Organizations, Institutions, and Normes in Agent Systems XI: COIN 2015 International Workshops, COIN@AAMAS, Istanbul, Turkey, May 4, 2015, COIN@IJCAI, Buenos Aires, Argentina, July 26, 2015, Revised Selected Papers. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 9628, Springer, pp. 354-375. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-42691-4_20

APA

Soriano Marcolino, L., Xu, H., Gerber, D. J., Kolev, B., Price, S., Pantazis, E., & Tambe, M. (2016). Multi-agent team formation for design problems. In V. Dignum, P. Noriega, M. Sensoy, & J. S. Sichman (Eds.), Coordination, Organizations, Institutions, and Normes in Agent Systems XI: COIN 2015 International Workshops, COIN@AAMAS, Istanbul, Turkey, May 4, 2015, COIN@IJCAI, Buenos Aires, Argentina, July 26, 2015, Revised Selected Papers (pp. 354-375). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Vol. 9628). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-42691-4_20

Vancouver

Soriano Marcolino L, Xu H, Gerber DJ, Kolev B, Price S, Pantazis E et al. Multi-agent team formation for design problems. In Dignum V, Noriega P, Sensoy M, Sichman JS, editors, Coordination, Organizations, Institutions, and Normes in Agent Systems XI: COIN 2015 International Workshops, COIN@AAMAS, Istanbul, Turkey, May 4, 2015, COIN@IJCAI, Buenos Aires, Argentina, July 26, 2015, Revised Selected Papers. Springer. 2016. p. 354-375. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science). doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-42691-4_20

Author

Soriano Marcolino, Leandro ; Xu, Haifeng ; Gerber, David J. et al. / Multi-agent team formation for design problems. Coordination, Organizations, Institutions, and Normes in Agent Systems XI: COIN 2015 International Workshops, COIN@AAMAS, Istanbul, Turkey, May 4, 2015, COIN@IJCAI, Buenos Aires, Argentina, July 26, 2015, Revised Selected Papers. editor / Virginia Dignum ; Pablo Noriega ; Murat Sensoy ; Jaime Simão Sichman. Springer, 2016. pp. 354-375 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science).

Bibtex

@inproceedings{d2528bf80ab84208bcfa398521735f49,
title = "Multi-agent team formation for design problems",
abstract = "Design imposes a novel social choice problem: using a team of voting agents, maximize the number of optimal solutions; allowing a user to then take an aesthetical choice. In an open system of design agents, team formation is fundamental. We present the first model of agent teams for design. For maximum applicability, we envision agents that are queried for a single opinion, and multiple solutions are obtained by multiple iterations. We show that diverse teams composed of agents with different preferences maximize the number of optimal solutions, while uniform teams composed of multiple copies of the best agent are in general suboptimal. Our experiments study the model in bounded time; and we also study a real system, where agents vote to design buildings.",
author = "{Soriano Marcolino}, Leandro and Haifeng Xu and Gerber, {David J.} and Boian Kolev and Samori Price and Evangelos Pantazis and Milind Tambe",
note = "The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-42691-4_20",
year = "2016",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-319-42691-4_20",
language = "English",
isbn = "9783319426907",
series = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science",
publisher = "Springer",
pages = "354--375",
editor = "Virginia Dignum and Pablo Noriega and Murat Sensoy and Sichman, {Jaime Sim{\~a}o}",
booktitle = "Coordination, Organizations, Institutions, and Normes in Agent Systems XI",

}

RIS

TY - GEN

T1 - Multi-agent team formation for design problems

AU - Soriano Marcolino, Leandro

AU - Xu, Haifeng

AU - Gerber, David J.

AU - Kolev, Boian

AU - Price, Samori

AU - Pantazis, Evangelos

AU - Tambe, Milind

N1 - The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-42691-4_20

PY - 2016

Y1 - 2016

N2 - Design imposes a novel social choice problem: using a team of voting agents, maximize the number of optimal solutions; allowing a user to then take an aesthetical choice. In an open system of design agents, team formation is fundamental. We present the first model of agent teams for design. For maximum applicability, we envision agents that are queried for a single opinion, and multiple solutions are obtained by multiple iterations. We show that diverse teams composed of agents with different preferences maximize the number of optimal solutions, while uniform teams composed of multiple copies of the best agent are in general suboptimal. Our experiments study the model in bounded time; and we also study a real system, where agents vote to design buildings.

AB - Design imposes a novel social choice problem: using a team of voting agents, maximize the number of optimal solutions; allowing a user to then take an aesthetical choice. In an open system of design agents, team formation is fundamental. We present the first model of agent teams for design. For maximum applicability, we envision agents that are queried for a single opinion, and multiple solutions are obtained by multiple iterations. We show that diverse teams composed of agents with different preferences maximize the number of optimal solutions, while uniform teams composed of multiple copies of the best agent are in general suboptimal. Our experiments study the model in bounded time; and we also study a real system, where agents vote to design buildings.

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-319-42691-4_20

DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-42691-4_20

M3 - Conference contribution/Paper

SN - 9783319426907

T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science

SP - 354

EP - 375

BT - Coordination, Organizations, Institutions, and Normes in Agent Systems XI

A2 - Dignum, Virginia

A2 - Noriega, Pablo

A2 - Sensoy, Murat

A2 - Sichman, Jaime Simão

PB - Springer

ER -