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Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency

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Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency. / Bag, P.K.; Sabourian, H.; Winter, E.
In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 144, No. 3, 05.2009, p. 1278-1299.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Bag, PK, Sabourian, H & Winter, E 2009, 'Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency', Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 144, no. 3, pp. 1278-1299. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.11.012

APA

Bag, P. K., Sabourian, H., & Winter, E. (2009). Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency. Journal of Economic Theory, 144(3), 1278-1299. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.11.012

Vancouver

Bag PK, Sabourian H, Winter E. Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency. Journal of Economic Theory. 2009 May;144(3):1278-1299. doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2008.11.012

Author

Bag, P.K. ; Sabourian, H. ; Winter, E. / Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency. In: Journal of Economic Theory. 2009 ; Vol. 144, No. 3. pp. 1278-1299.

Bibtex

@article{265c6aaf46b84dfd84bc25d7f9890307,
title = "Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency",
abstract = "A class of voting procedures based on repeated ballots and elimination of one candidate in each round is shown to always induce an outcome in the top cycle and is thus Condorcet consistent, when voters behave strategically. This is an important class as it covers multi-stage, sequential elimination extensions of all standard one-shot voting rules (with the exception of negative voting), the same one-shot rules that would fail Condorcet consistency. The necessity of repeated ballots and sequential elimination are demonstrated by further showing that Condorcet consistency would fail in all standard voting rules that violate one or both of these conditions. {\textcopyright} 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.",
keywords = "Condorcet consistency, Markov equilibrium, Multi-stage voting, Scoring rules, Sequential elimination, Top cycle",
author = "P.K. Bag and H. Sabourian and E. Winter",
year = "2009",
month = may,
doi = "10.1016/j.jet.2008.11.012",
language = "English",
volume = "144",
pages = "1278--1299",
journal = "Journal of Economic Theory",
issn = "0022-0531",
publisher = "ELSEVIER ACADEMIC PRESS INC",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency

AU - Bag, P.K.

AU - Sabourian, H.

AU - Winter, E.

PY - 2009/5

Y1 - 2009/5

N2 - A class of voting procedures based on repeated ballots and elimination of one candidate in each round is shown to always induce an outcome in the top cycle and is thus Condorcet consistent, when voters behave strategically. This is an important class as it covers multi-stage, sequential elimination extensions of all standard one-shot voting rules (with the exception of negative voting), the same one-shot rules that would fail Condorcet consistency. The necessity of repeated ballots and sequential elimination are demonstrated by further showing that Condorcet consistency would fail in all standard voting rules that violate one or both of these conditions. © 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

AB - A class of voting procedures based on repeated ballots and elimination of one candidate in each round is shown to always induce an outcome in the top cycle and is thus Condorcet consistent, when voters behave strategically. This is an important class as it covers multi-stage, sequential elimination extensions of all standard one-shot voting rules (with the exception of negative voting), the same one-shot rules that would fail Condorcet consistency. The necessity of repeated ballots and sequential elimination are demonstrated by further showing that Condorcet consistency would fail in all standard voting rules that violate one or both of these conditions. © 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

KW - Condorcet consistency

KW - Markov equilibrium

KW - Multi-stage voting

KW - Scoring rules

KW - Sequential elimination

KW - Top cycle

U2 - 10.1016/j.jet.2008.11.012

DO - 10.1016/j.jet.2008.11.012

M3 - Journal article

VL - 144

SP - 1278

EP - 1299

JO - Journal of Economic Theory

JF - Journal of Economic Theory

SN - 0022-0531

IS - 3

ER -