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MUTUALITY, PERFORMANCE AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION

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MUTUALITY, PERFORMANCE AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION. / Ingham, Hilary; Thompson, Steve.
In: Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 57, No. 3, 31.08.1995, p. 295-308.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Ingham, H & Thompson, S 1995, 'MUTUALITY, PERFORMANCE AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION', Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, vol. 57, no. 3, pp. 295-308. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0084.1995.mp57003002.x

APA

Ingham, H., & Thompson, S. (1995). MUTUALITY, PERFORMANCE AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 57(3), 295-308. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0084.1995.mp57003002.x

Vancouver

Ingham H, Thompson S. MUTUALITY, PERFORMANCE AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics. 1995 Aug 31;57(3):295-308. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0084.1995.mp57003002.x

Author

Ingham, Hilary ; Thompson, Steve. / MUTUALITY, PERFORMANCE AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION. In: Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics. 1995 ; Vol. 57, No. 3. pp. 295-308.

Bibtex

@article{79555c2504c44ce6b475606acb862d3c,
title = "MUTUALITY, PERFORMANCE AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION",
abstract = "ABSTRACTS The determinants of CEO compensation within the UK Building Society sector are investigated. Using an unbalanced panel data set for the period 1986–90, we find only weak support for the existence of a positive link between performance and CEO remuneration. In contrast we find age to be an important determinant of CEO pay increases. This finding reinforces the oft noted potential for inefficiencies in mutuals. Given that alternative market based control systems are absent, our results suggests that there is a lack of any mechanism to align owner and manager interests in the UK building societies.",
author = "Hilary Ingham and Steve Thompson",
year = "1995",
month = aug,
day = "31",
doi = "10.1111/j.1468-0084.1995.mp57003002.x",
language = "English",
volume = "57",
pages = "295--308",
journal = "Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics",
issn = "0305-9049",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - MUTUALITY, PERFORMANCE AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION

AU - Ingham, Hilary

AU - Thompson, Steve

PY - 1995/8/31

Y1 - 1995/8/31

N2 - ABSTRACTS The determinants of CEO compensation within the UK Building Society sector are investigated. Using an unbalanced panel data set for the period 1986–90, we find only weak support for the existence of a positive link between performance and CEO remuneration. In contrast we find age to be an important determinant of CEO pay increases. This finding reinforces the oft noted potential for inefficiencies in mutuals. Given that alternative market based control systems are absent, our results suggests that there is a lack of any mechanism to align owner and manager interests in the UK building societies.

AB - ABSTRACTS The determinants of CEO compensation within the UK Building Society sector are investigated. Using an unbalanced panel data set for the period 1986–90, we find only weak support for the existence of a positive link between performance and CEO remuneration. In contrast we find age to be an important determinant of CEO pay increases. This finding reinforces the oft noted potential for inefficiencies in mutuals. Given that alternative market based control systems are absent, our results suggests that there is a lack of any mechanism to align owner and manager interests in the UK building societies.

U2 - 10.1111/j.1468-0084.1995.mp57003002.x

DO - 10.1111/j.1468-0084.1995.mp57003002.x

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:84981633429

VL - 57

SP - 295

EP - 308

JO - Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics

JF - Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics

SN - 0305-9049

IS - 3

ER -