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Negotiations in multi-issue committees

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Negotiations in multi-issue committees. / Winter, E.
In: Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 65, No. 3, 09.1997, p. 323-342.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Winter, E 1997, 'Negotiations in multi-issue committees', Journal of Public Economics, vol. 65, no. 3, pp. 323-342. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(96)01627-1

APA

Winter, E. (1997). Negotiations in multi-issue committees. Journal of Public Economics, 65(3), 323-342. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(96)01627-1

Vancouver

Winter E. Negotiations in multi-issue committees. Journal of Public Economics. 1997 Sept;65(3):323-342. doi: 10.1016/S0047-2727(96)01627-1

Author

Winter, E. / Negotiations in multi-issue committees. In: Journal of Public Economics. 1997 ; Vol. 65, No. 3. pp. 323-342.

Bibtex

@article{b990515f8cda4539bab593fb65d99ff5,
title = "Negotiations in multi-issue committees",
abstract = "We propose a non-cooperative bargaining approach to the problem of collective decision making in committees by modelling this process as a sequential bargaining game. The main objective of the paper is to discuss the formation of the agenda in multi-issue committees, and its relation to the importance of the issues. We start by asserting that in the case of a single issue the set of all equilibrium outcomes of our game coincides with the set of coalitional stable outcomes. We then consider multi-issue committees to discuss the problem of forming agendas. We argue that from the point of view of efficiency and stability the most important issues should be put first on the agenda. We conclude with a sufficient condition (on players' preferences), which guarantees the efficiency and stability of the bargaining outcomes for every possible agenda. {\textcopyright} 1997 Elsevier Science S.A.",
keywords = "Agenda, Committees, Negotiations",
author = "E. Winter",
year = "1997",
month = sep,
doi = "10.1016/S0047-2727(96)01627-1",
language = "English",
volume = "65",
pages = "323--342",
journal = "Journal of Public Economics",
issn = "0047-2727",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Negotiations in multi-issue committees

AU - Winter, E.

PY - 1997/9

Y1 - 1997/9

N2 - We propose a non-cooperative bargaining approach to the problem of collective decision making in committees by modelling this process as a sequential bargaining game. The main objective of the paper is to discuss the formation of the agenda in multi-issue committees, and its relation to the importance of the issues. We start by asserting that in the case of a single issue the set of all equilibrium outcomes of our game coincides with the set of coalitional stable outcomes. We then consider multi-issue committees to discuss the problem of forming agendas. We argue that from the point of view of efficiency and stability the most important issues should be put first on the agenda. We conclude with a sufficient condition (on players' preferences), which guarantees the efficiency and stability of the bargaining outcomes for every possible agenda. © 1997 Elsevier Science S.A.

AB - We propose a non-cooperative bargaining approach to the problem of collective decision making in committees by modelling this process as a sequential bargaining game. The main objective of the paper is to discuss the formation of the agenda in multi-issue committees, and its relation to the importance of the issues. We start by asserting that in the case of a single issue the set of all equilibrium outcomes of our game coincides with the set of coalitional stable outcomes. We then consider multi-issue committees to discuss the problem of forming agendas. We argue that from the point of view of efficiency and stability the most important issues should be put first on the agenda. We conclude with a sufficient condition (on players' preferences), which guarantees the efficiency and stability of the bargaining outcomes for every possible agenda. © 1997 Elsevier Science S.A.

KW - Agenda

KW - Committees

KW - Negotiations

U2 - 10.1016/S0047-2727(96)01627-1

DO - 10.1016/S0047-2727(96)01627-1

M3 - Journal article

VL - 65

SP - 323

EP - 342

JO - Journal of Public Economics

JF - Journal of Public Economics

SN - 0047-2727

IS - 3

ER -