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New Perspectives on the Governance of Executive Compensation: Examining the Role and Effect of Compensation Consultants

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New Perspectives on the Governance of Executive Compensation: Examining the Role and Effect of Compensation Consultants. / Conyon, Martin; Peck, S; Sadler, G.
In: Journal of Management and Governance, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2011, p. 29-58.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

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Conyon M, Peck S, Sadler G. New Perspectives on the Governance of Executive Compensation: Examining the Role and Effect of Compensation Consultants. Journal of Management and Governance. 2011;15(1):29-58. doi: 10.1007/s10997-009-9117-6

Author

Conyon, Martin ; Peck, S ; Sadler, G. / New Perspectives on the Governance of Executive Compensation: Examining the Role and Effect of Compensation Consultants. In: Journal of Management and Governance. 2011 ; Vol. 15, No. 1. pp. 29-58.

Bibtex

@article{ff914e7172fa452b8f7a58daf1ee618c,
title = "New Perspectives on the Governance of Executive Compensation: Examining the Role and Effect of Compensation Consultants",
abstract = "We develop a multi-theoretic approach, drawing on economic, institutional, managerial power and social comparison literatures to explain the role of the external compensation consultant in the top management pay setting institutional field. Taking advantage of recent disclosure requirements in the UK, we collect data on compensation consultant use in 232 large companies. We show that consultants are a prevalent part of the CEO pay setting scene, and document evidence of all advisor use. Our econometric results show that consultant use is associated with firm size and the equity pay mix. We also show that CEO pay is positively associated with peer firms that share consultants, with higher board and consultant interlocks, and some evidence that where firms supply other business services to the firm, CEO pay is greater. ",
keywords = " Executive compensation, Consultants",
author = "Martin Conyon and S Peck and G Sadler",
year = "2011",
doi = "10.1007/s10997-009-9117-6",
language = "English",
volume = "15",
pages = "29--58",
journal = "Journal of Management and Governance",
issn = "1385-3457",
publisher = "Springer New York",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - New Perspectives on the Governance of Executive Compensation: Examining the Role and Effect of Compensation Consultants

AU - Conyon, Martin

AU - Peck, S

AU - Sadler, G

PY - 2011

Y1 - 2011

N2 - We develop a multi-theoretic approach, drawing on economic, institutional, managerial power and social comparison literatures to explain the role of the external compensation consultant in the top management pay setting institutional field. Taking advantage of recent disclosure requirements in the UK, we collect data on compensation consultant use in 232 large companies. We show that consultants are a prevalent part of the CEO pay setting scene, and document evidence of all advisor use. Our econometric results show that consultant use is associated with firm size and the equity pay mix. We also show that CEO pay is positively associated with peer firms that share consultants, with higher board and consultant interlocks, and some evidence that where firms supply other business services to the firm, CEO pay is greater.

AB - We develop a multi-theoretic approach, drawing on economic, institutional, managerial power and social comparison literatures to explain the role of the external compensation consultant in the top management pay setting institutional field. Taking advantage of recent disclosure requirements in the UK, we collect data on compensation consultant use in 232 large companies. We show that consultants are a prevalent part of the CEO pay setting scene, and document evidence of all advisor use. Our econometric results show that consultant use is associated with firm size and the equity pay mix. We also show that CEO pay is positively associated with peer firms that share consultants, with higher board and consultant interlocks, and some evidence that where firms supply other business services to the firm, CEO pay is greater.

KW - Executive compensation

KW - Consultants

U2 - 10.1007/s10997-009-9117-6

DO - 10.1007/s10997-009-9117-6

M3 - Journal article

VL - 15

SP - 29

EP - 58

JO - Journal of Management and Governance

JF - Journal of Management and Governance

SN - 1385-3457

IS - 1

ER -