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Non-cooperative bargaining in natural monopolies

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Non-cooperative bargaining in natural monopolies. / Winter, E.
In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 64, No. 1, 10.1994, p. 202-220.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Winter, E 1994, 'Non-cooperative bargaining in natural monopolies', Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 64, no. 1, pp. 202-220. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1994.1062

APA

Winter, E. (1994). Non-cooperative bargaining in natural monopolies. Journal of Economic Theory, 64(1), 202-220. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1994.1062

Vancouver

Winter E. Non-cooperative bargaining in natural monopolies. Journal of Economic Theory. 1994 Oct;64(1):202-220. doi: 10.1006/jeth.1994.1062

Author

Winter, E. / Non-cooperative bargaining in natural monopolies. In: Journal of Economic Theory. 1994 ; Vol. 64, No. 1. pp. 202-220.

Bibtex

@article{1c8c760e086546ffb3364ba5dd0b5b7f,
title = "Non-cooperative bargaining in natural monopolies",
abstract = "The joint production of a single output from a single input by a group of potential users of a technology is usually analyzed in the literature using a “cooperative” approach. We provide an analysis for such economies by means of non-cooperative bargaining. Two bargaining models are analyzed, one based on demands the other on proposals. We show that the convexity of the production function implies that subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of these bargaining games are coalition stable, (i.e., core outcomes). In the case of the proposal model, the equilibrium outcomes yield even a full characterization of the core. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers C72, D21, D42. {\textcopyright} 1994 Academic Press, Inc.",
author = "E. Winter",
year = "1994",
month = oct,
doi = "10.1006/jeth.1994.1062",
language = "English",
volume = "64",
pages = "202--220",
journal = "Journal of Economic Theory",
issn = "0022-0531",
publisher = "ELSEVIER ACADEMIC PRESS INC",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Non-cooperative bargaining in natural monopolies

AU - Winter, E.

PY - 1994/10

Y1 - 1994/10

N2 - The joint production of a single output from a single input by a group of potential users of a technology is usually analyzed in the literature using a “cooperative” approach. We provide an analysis for such economies by means of non-cooperative bargaining. Two bargaining models are analyzed, one based on demands the other on proposals. We show that the convexity of the production function implies that subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of these bargaining games are coalition stable, (i.e., core outcomes). In the case of the proposal model, the equilibrium outcomes yield even a full characterization of the core. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers C72, D21, D42. © 1994 Academic Press, Inc.

AB - The joint production of a single output from a single input by a group of potential users of a technology is usually analyzed in the literature using a “cooperative” approach. We provide an analysis for such economies by means of non-cooperative bargaining. Two bargaining models are analyzed, one based on demands the other on proposals. We show that the convexity of the production function implies that subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of these bargaining games are coalition stable, (i.e., core outcomes). In the case of the proposal model, the equilibrium outcomes yield even a full characterization of the core. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers C72, D21, D42. © 1994 Academic Press, Inc.

U2 - 10.1006/jeth.1994.1062

DO - 10.1006/jeth.1994.1062

M3 - Journal article

VL - 64

SP - 202

EP - 220

JO - Journal of Economic Theory

JF - Journal of Economic Theory

SN - 0022-0531

IS - 1

ER -