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On the distribution of public funding to political parties

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

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On the distribution of public funding to political parties. / Troumpounis, Orestis.
In: Economics Letters, Vol. 116, No. 3, 09.2012, p. 367-370.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Troumpounis, O 2012, 'On the distribution of public funding to political parties', Economics Letters, vol. 116, no. 3, pp. 367-370. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.04.001

APA

Troumpounis, O. (2012). On the distribution of public funding to political parties. Economics Letters, 116(3), 367-370. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.04.001

Vancouver

Troumpounis O. On the distribution of public funding to political parties. Economics Letters. 2012 Sept;116(3):367-370. doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.04.001

Author

Troumpounis, Orestis. / On the distribution of public funding to political parties. In: Economics Letters. 2012 ; Vol. 116, No. 3. pp. 367-370.

Bibtex

@article{88e230ffd7114eb681ee8881290d5b4a,
title = "On the distribution of public funding to political parties",
abstract = "The distribution of direct public funding to political parties is based on two criteria: (1) performance at the election (funding per vote), or (2) representation in the parliament (funding per seat). Using a two-party group turnout model, we compare the effect of the two funding systems on parties{\textquoteright} mobilization effort and the equilibrium turnout. Allowing one party to have a larger support than the other, we uncover interesting differences regarding the equilibrium structure: while in the unique equilibrium of per seat funding systems both parties exert the same amount of effort, a per vote funding system results in an asymmetric equilibrium in which the advantaged party exerts higher effort than its opponent. We furthermore show that, at the same cost, a per vote funding system always yields higher turnout than a per seat funding system, sacrificing the representativity of the electoral outcome.",
keywords = "Public funding, Turnout , Mobilization effort , Group-turnout model , Campaign finance",
author = "Orestis Troumpounis",
year = "2012",
month = sep,
doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2012.04.001",
language = "English",
volume = "116",
pages = "367--370",
journal = "Economics Letters",
issn = "0165-1765",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - On the distribution of public funding to political parties

AU - Troumpounis, Orestis

PY - 2012/9

Y1 - 2012/9

N2 - The distribution of direct public funding to political parties is based on two criteria: (1) performance at the election (funding per vote), or (2) representation in the parliament (funding per seat). Using a two-party group turnout model, we compare the effect of the two funding systems on parties’ mobilization effort and the equilibrium turnout. Allowing one party to have a larger support than the other, we uncover interesting differences regarding the equilibrium structure: while in the unique equilibrium of per seat funding systems both parties exert the same amount of effort, a per vote funding system results in an asymmetric equilibrium in which the advantaged party exerts higher effort than its opponent. We furthermore show that, at the same cost, a per vote funding system always yields higher turnout than a per seat funding system, sacrificing the representativity of the electoral outcome.

AB - The distribution of direct public funding to political parties is based on two criteria: (1) performance at the election (funding per vote), or (2) representation in the parliament (funding per seat). Using a two-party group turnout model, we compare the effect of the two funding systems on parties’ mobilization effort and the equilibrium turnout. Allowing one party to have a larger support than the other, we uncover interesting differences regarding the equilibrium structure: while in the unique equilibrium of per seat funding systems both parties exert the same amount of effort, a per vote funding system results in an asymmetric equilibrium in which the advantaged party exerts higher effort than its opponent. We furthermore show that, at the same cost, a per vote funding system always yields higher turnout than a per seat funding system, sacrificing the representativity of the electoral outcome.

KW - Public funding

KW - Turnout

KW - Mobilization effort

KW - Group-turnout model

KW - Campaign finance

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.04.001

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.04.001

M3 - Journal article

VL - 116

SP - 367

EP - 370

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

SN - 0165-1765

IS - 3

ER -