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Optimal competitive capacity strategies: Evidence from the container shipping market

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Optimal competitive capacity strategies: Evidence from the container shipping market. / Li, Xishu; Zuidwijk, Rob; de Koster, MBM.
In: Omega: The International Journal of Management Science, Vol. 115, 102790, 28.02.2023.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Li, X, Zuidwijk, R & de Koster, MBM 2023, 'Optimal competitive capacity strategies: Evidence from the container shipping market', Omega: The International Journal of Management Science, vol. 115, 102790. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.omega.2022.102790

APA

Li, X., Zuidwijk, R., & de Koster, MBM. (2023). Optimal competitive capacity strategies: Evidence from the container shipping market. Omega: The International Journal of Management Science, 115, Article 102790. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.omega.2022.102790

Vancouver

Li X, Zuidwijk R, de Koster MBM. Optimal competitive capacity strategies: Evidence from the container shipping market. Omega: The International Journal of Management Science. 2023 Feb 28;115:102790. Epub 2022 Nov 6. doi: 10.1016/j.omega.2022.102790

Author

Li, Xishu ; Zuidwijk, Rob ; de Koster, MBM. / Optimal competitive capacity strategies : Evidence from the container shipping market. In: Omega: The International Journal of Management Science. 2023 ; Vol. 115.

Bibtex

@article{dd55de4b4b814092895add1beaf55f0a,
title = "Optimal competitive capacity strategies: Evidence from the container shipping market",
abstract = "For nearly two decades, ocean carriers have been locked in an arms race for capacity, which has led to huge losses for many and even bankruptcy for some. We investigate the nature of this investment race by studying a long-term capacity investment problem in a duopoly under demand uncertainty. In our model, two firms make sequential capacity decisions, responding to each other{\textquoteright}s current and future capacity. We consider two types of strategies which differ in terms of how a firm considers the opponent{\textquoteright}s future capacity in its own strategy: a proactive strategy where the firm assumes that the opponent will respond using a certain strategy, or a reactive strategy where the firm assumes that the opponent{\textquoteright}s future capacity remains unchanged. In the proactive case, we allow the firm to have different assumptions on the opponent{\textquoteright}s strategy, representing different amounts of information the firm has on the opponent. For each type of strategies, we derive the firm{\textquoteright}s optimal decisions on both the timing and size of capacity adjustments, specified by an array of intervals for the optimal capacity in a given capacity space in each period. Using detailed data from the container shipping market (2000–2015), we illustrate how to plan competitive capacity investments, following our model. By comparing the optimal decisions specified by our model with the reality, we show that the realized capacity decisions of the leading carriers, which were often questioned as irrational, are close to optimal, assuming these carriers follow proactive strategies. By revealing the underlying structures of different strategies, that is, the stayput intervals, we show how a specific strategy brings value to firms under competition. Based on our results, we provide practical guidelines to carriers and firms which operate in a similar competitive market for implementing an effective competitive capacity strategy.",
keywords = "Capacity, Dynamic investment, Proactive, Feedback strategy, Stackelberg competition",
author = "Xishu Li and Rob Zuidwijk and {de Koster}, MBM",
year = "2023",
month = feb,
day = "28",
doi = "10.1016/j.omega.2022.102790",
language = "English",
volume = "115",
journal = "Omega: The International Journal of Management Science",
issn = "0305-0483",
publisher = "Elsevier BV",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Optimal competitive capacity strategies

T2 - Evidence from the container shipping market

AU - Li, Xishu

AU - Zuidwijk, Rob

AU - de Koster, MBM

PY - 2023/2/28

Y1 - 2023/2/28

N2 - For nearly two decades, ocean carriers have been locked in an arms race for capacity, which has led to huge losses for many and even bankruptcy for some. We investigate the nature of this investment race by studying a long-term capacity investment problem in a duopoly under demand uncertainty. In our model, two firms make sequential capacity decisions, responding to each other’s current and future capacity. We consider two types of strategies which differ in terms of how a firm considers the opponent’s future capacity in its own strategy: a proactive strategy where the firm assumes that the opponent will respond using a certain strategy, or a reactive strategy where the firm assumes that the opponent’s future capacity remains unchanged. In the proactive case, we allow the firm to have different assumptions on the opponent’s strategy, representing different amounts of information the firm has on the opponent. For each type of strategies, we derive the firm’s optimal decisions on both the timing and size of capacity adjustments, specified by an array of intervals for the optimal capacity in a given capacity space in each period. Using detailed data from the container shipping market (2000–2015), we illustrate how to plan competitive capacity investments, following our model. By comparing the optimal decisions specified by our model with the reality, we show that the realized capacity decisions of the leading carriers, which were often questioned as irrational, are close to optimal, assuming these carriers follow proactive strategies. By revealing the underlying structures of different strategies, that is, the stayput intervals, we show how a specific strategy brings value to firms under competition. Based on our results, we provide practical guidelines to carriers and firms which operate in a similar competitive market for implementing an effective competitive capacity strategy.

AB - For nearly two decades, ocean carriers have been locked in an arms race for capacity, which has led to huge losses for many and even bankruptcy for some. We investigate the nature of this investment race by studying a long-term capacity investment problem in a duopoly under demand uncertainty. In our model, two firms make sequential capacity decisions, responding to each other’s current and future capacity. We consider two types of strategies which differ in terms of how a firm considers the opponent’s future capacity in its own strategy: a proactive strategy where the firm assumes that the opponent will respond using a certain strategy, or a reactive strategy where the firm assumes that the opponent’s future capacity remains unchanged. In the proactive case, we allow the firm to have different assumptions on the opponent’s strategy, representing different amounts of information the firm has on the opponent. For each type of strategies, we derive the firm’s optimal decisions on both the timing and size of capacity adjustments, specified by an array of intervals for the optimal capacity in a given capacity space in each period. Using detailed data from the container shipping market (2000–2015), we illustrate how to plan competitive capacity investments, following our model. By comparing the optimal decisions specified by our model with the reality, we show that the realized capacity decisions of the leading carriers, which were often questioned as irrational, are close to optimal, assuming these carriers follow proactive strategies. By revealing the underlying structures of different strategies, that is, the stayput intervals, we show how a specific strategy brings value to firms under competition. Based on our results, we provide practical guidelines to carriers and firms which operate in a similar competitive market for implementing an effective competitive capacity strategy.

KW - Capacity

KW - Dynamic investment

KW - Proactive

KW - Feedback strategy

KW - Stackelberg competition

U2 - 10.1016/j.omega.2022.102790

DO - 10.1016/j.omega.2022.102790

M3 - Journal article

VL - 115

JO - Omega: The International Journal of Management Science

JF - Omega: The International Journal of Management Science

SN - 0305-0483

M1 - 102790

ER -