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Optimal privatization in a mixed duopoly with consistent conjectures

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Optimal privatization in a mixed duopoly with consistent conjectures. / Heywood, John; Ye, Guangliang.
In: Journal of Economics, Vol. 101, No. 3, 11.2010, p. 231-246.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Heywood, J & Ye, G 2010, 'Optimal privatization in a mixed duopoly with consistent conjectures', Journal of Economics, vol. 101, no. 3, pp. 231-246. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-010-0156-x

APA

Heywood, J., & Ye, G. (2010). Optimal privatization in a mixed duopoly with consistent conjectures. Journal of Economics, 101(3), 231-246. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-010-0156-x

Vancouver

Heywood J, Ye G. Optimal privatization in a mixed duopoly with consistent conjectures. Journal of Economics. 2010 Nov;101(3):231-246. doi: 10.1007/s00712-010-0156-x

Author

Heywood, John ; Ye, Guangliang. / Optimal privatization in a mixed duopoly with consistent conjectures. In: Journal of Economics. 2010 ; Vol. 101, No. 3. pp. 231-246.

Bibtex

@article{30d0e635bd9742cab170e0c288604e44,
title = "Optimal privatization in a mixed duopoly with consistent conjectures",
abstract = "We show that partially privatizing a public firm alters underlying conjectures, in turn, changing the optimal degree of privatization. The consistent conjectures equilibrium (CCE) generates substantially greater optimal privatization than does any conjecture shared between the firms including the standard Cournot–Nash equilibrium (CNE). Yet, when the private rival is foreign, the CCE generates substantially less privatization than the CNE. The optimal extent of privatization with a domestic rival exceeds that with a foreign rival in the CCE as well as in the CNE.",
keywords = "Consistent conjectures, Partial privatization , Mixed oligopoly",
author = "John Heywood and Guangliang Ye",
year = "2010",
month = nov,
doi = "10.1007/s00712-010-0156-x",
language = "English",
volume = "101",
pages = "231--246",
journal = "Journal of Economics",
issn = "0931-8658",
publisher = "Springer Wien",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Optimal privatization in a mixed duopoly with consistent conjectures

AU - Heywood, John

AU - Ye, Guangliang

PY - 2010/11

Y1 - 2010/11

N2 - We show that partially privatizing a public firm alters underlying conjectures, in turn, changing the optimal degree of privatization. The consistent conjectures equilibrium (CCE) generates substantially greater optimal privatization than does any conjecture shared between the firms including the standard Cournot–Nash equilibrium (CNE). Yet, when the private rival is foreign, the CCE generates substantially less privatization than the CNE. The optimal extent of privatization with a domestic rival exceeds that with a foreign rival in the CCE as well as in the CNE.

AB - We show that partially privatizing a public firm alters underlying conjectures, in turn, changing the optimal degree of privatization. The consistent conjectures equilibrium (CCE) generates substantially greater optimal privatization than does any conjecture shared between the firms including the standard Cournot–Nash equilibrium (CNE). Yet, when the private rival is foreign, the CCE generates substantially less privatization than the CNE. The optimal extent of privatization with a domestic rival exceeds that with a foreign rival in the CCE as well as in the CNE.

KW - Consistent conjectures

KW - Partial privatization

KW - Mixed oligopoly

U2 - 10.1007/s00712-010-0156-x

DO - 10.1007/s00712-010-0156-x

M3 - Journal article

VL - 101

SP - 231

EP - 246

JO - Journal of Economics

JF - Journal of Economics

SN - 0931-8658

IS - 3

ER -