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Order independent equilibria

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Order independent equilibria. / Moldovanu, B.; Winter, E.
In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 9, No. 1, 04.1995, p. 21-34.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Moldovanu, B & Winter, E 1995, 'Order independent equilibria', Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 21-34. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1995.1003

APA

Moldovanu, B., & Winter, E. (1995). Order independent equilibria. Games and Economic Behavior, 9(1), 21-34. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1995.1003

Vancouver

Moldovanu B, Winter E. Order independent equilibria. Games and Economic Behavior. 1995 Apr;9(1):21-34. doi: 10.1006/game.1995.1003

Author

Moldovanu, B. ; Winter, E. / Order independent equilibria. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 1995 ; Vol. 9, No. 1. pp. 21-34.

Bibtex

@article{e67c507f7208413887d9c4cac980711a,
title = "Order independent equilibria",
abstract = "We study a noncooperative game of coalition formation, based on an underlying game in coalitional form. We introduce order independent equilibria (OIE). A strategy profile is an OIE if, for any specification of first movers in the sequential game, it remains an equilibrium and leads to the same payoff. Our results are: (1) Payoffs in OIE that use pure, stationary strategies must be in the core of the underlying game in coalitional form. (2) If the underlying game has the property that all its subgames have nonempty cores then, for each payoff vector, there exists an OIE with the same payoff. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C71, C72, C78. {\textcopyright} 1995 Academic Press. All rights reserved.",
author = "B. Moldovanu and E. Winter",
year = "1995",
month = apr,
doi = "10.1006/game.1995.1003",
language = "English",
volume = "9",
pages = "21--34",
journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",
issn = "0899-8256",
publisher = "ELSEVIER ACADEMIC PRESS INC",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Order independent equilibria

AU - Moldovanu, B.

AU - Winter, E.

PY - 1995/4

Y1 - 1995/4

N2 - We study a noncooperative game of coalition formation, based on an underlying game in coalitional form. We introduce order independent equilibria (OIE). A strategy profile is an OIE if, for any specification of first movers in the sequential game, it remains an equilibrium and leads to the same payoff. Our results are: (1) Payoffs in OIE that use pure, stationary strategies must be in the core of the underlying game in coalitional form. (2) If the underlying game has the property that all its subgames have nonempty cores then, for each payoff vector, there exists an OIE with the same payoff. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C71, C72, C78. © 1995 Academic Press. All rights reserved.

AB - We study a noncooperative game of coalition formation, based on an underlying game in coalitional form. We introduce order independent equilibria (OIE). A strategy profile is an OIE if, for any specification of first movers in the sequential game, it remains an equilibrium and leads to the same payoff. Our results are: (1) Payoffs in OIE that use pure, stationary strategies must be in the core of the underlying game in coalitional form. (2) If the underlying game has the property that all its subgames have nonempty cores then, for each payoff vector, there exists an OIE with the same payoff. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C71, C72, C78. © 1995 Academic Press. All rights reserved.

U2 - 10.1006/game.1995.1003

DO - 10.1006/game.1995.1003

M3 - Journal article

VL - 9

SP - 21

EP - 34

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

SN - 0899-8256

IS - 1

ER -