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Overcoming coordination failure in games with focal points: An experimental investigation

Research output: Working paper

Published

Standard

Overcoming coordination failure in games with focal points: An experimental investigation. / Rojo Arjona, David; Sitzia, Stefania; Zheng, Jiwei.
Lancaster: The Department of Economics, 2021. (Economics Working Papers Series).

Research output: Working paper

Harvard

Rojo Arjona, D, Sitzia, S & Zheng, J 2021 'Overcoming coordination failure in games with focal points: An experimental investigation' Economics Working Papers Series, The Department of Economics, Lancaster.

APA

Rojo Arjona, D., Sitzia, S., & Zheng, J. (2021). Overcoming coordination failure in games with focal points: An experimental investigation. (Economics Working Papers Series). The Department of Economics.

Vancouver

Rojo Arjona D, Sitzia S, Zheng J. Overcoming coordination failure in games with focal points: An experimental investigation. Lancaster: The Department of Economics. 2021 Aug 31. (Economics Working Papers Series).

Author

Rojo Arjona, David ; Sitzia, Stefania ; Zheng, Jiwei. / Overcoming coordination failure in games with focal points : An experimental investigation. Lancaster : The Department of Economics, 2021. (Economics Working Papers Series).

Bibtex

@techreport{53b3c099998745a2851997f5dff2af95,
title = "Overcoming coordination failure in games with focal points: An experimental investigation",
abstract = "Focal points (Schelling, 1960) have shown limitations as coordination devices ingames with conflict, such as the battle of the sexes games. We experimentally test whether an increase in their salience can counteract the negative impact of conflict on coordination. The intuition is that, in the presence of conflict, the solution to the coordination dilemma offered by the focal point loses importance. Increasing its salience increases its relevance and therefore coordination success. Our results provide strong support for this conjecture. Furthermore, when games feature outcomes with different degrees of payoffs{\textquoteright} inequality (i.e. the difference of players{\textquoteright} payoffs) and efficiency (i.e. the sum of players{\textquoteright} payoffs), increasing salience does not lead to an obvious increase in coordination, unless the salience of the focal point is maximal. ",
keywords = "coordination games, focal points, salience, conflict of interests, battle-of-the-sexes, intermixed-blocked effect",
author = "{Rojo Arjona}, David and Stefania Sitzia and Jiwei Zheng",
year = "2021",
month = aug,
day = "31",
language = "English",
series = "Economics Working Papers Series",
publisher = "The Department of Economics",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "The Department of Economics",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Overcoming coordination failure in games with focal points

T2 - An experimental investigation

AU - Rojo Arjona, David

AU - Sitzia, Stefania

AU - Zheng, Jiwei

PY - 2021/8/31

Y1 - 2021/8/31

N2 - Focal points (Schelling, 1960) have shown limitations as coordination devices ingames with conflict, such as the battle of the sexes games. We experimentally test whether an increase in their salience can counteract the negative impact of conflict on coordination. The intuition is that, in the presence of conflict, the solution to the coordination dilemma offered by the focal point loses importance. Increasing its salience increases its relevance and therefore coordination success. Our results provide strong support for this conjecture. Furthermore, when games feature outcomes with different degrees of payoffs’ inequality (i.e. the difference of players’ payoffs) and efficiency (i.e. the sum of players’ payoffs), increasing salience does not lead to an obvious increase in coordination, unless the salience of the focal point is maximal.

AB - Focal points (Schelling, 1960) have shown limitations as coordination devices ingames with conflict, such as the battle of the sexes games. We experimentally test whether an increase in their salience can counteract the negative impact of conflict on coordination. The intuition is that, in the presence of conflict, the solution to the coordination dilemma offered by the focal point loses importance. Increasing its salience increases its relevance and therefore coordination success. Our results provide strong support for this conjecture. Furthermore, when games feature outcomes with different degrees of payoffs’ inequality (i.e. the difference of players’ payoffs) and efficiency (i.e. the sum of players’ payoffs), increasing salience does not lead to an obvious increase in coordination, unless the salience of the focal point is maximal.

KW - coordination games

KW - focal points

KW - salience

KW - conflict of interests

KW - battle-of-the-sexes

KW - intermixed-blocked effect

M3 - Working paper

T3 - Economics Working Papers Series

BT - Overcoming coordination failure in games with focal points

PB - The Department of Economics

CY - Lancaster

ER -