Home > Research > Publications & Outputs > Overcoming coordination failure in games with f...

Research

Electronic data

  • Manuscript

    Accepted author manuscript, 1.2 MB, PDF document

    Available under license: CC BY-NC-ND: Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License

Text available via DOI:

Keywords

View graph of relations

Overcoming coordination failure in games with focal points: An experimental investigation

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Published

Standard

Overcoming coordination failure in games with focal points: An experimental investigation. / Rojo Arjona, David; Sitzia, Stefania; Zheng, Jiwei.
In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 136, 30.11.2022, p. 505-523.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Rojo Arjona, D, Sitzia, S & Zheng, J 2022, 'Overcoming coordination failure in games with focal points: An experimental investigation', Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 136, pp. 505-523. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.010

APA

Rojo Arjona, D., Sitzia, S., & Zheng, J. (2022). Overcoming coordination failure in games with focal points: An experimental investigation. Games and Economic Behavior, 136, 505-523. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.010

Vancouver

Rojo Arjona D, Sitzia S, Zheng J. Overcoming coordination failure in games with focal points: An experimental investigation. Games and Economic Behavior. 2022 Nov 30;136:505-523. Epub 2022 Nov 7. doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.010

Author

Rojo Arjona, David ; Sitzia, Stefania ; Zheng, Jiwei. / Overcoming coordination failure in games with focal points : An experimental investigation. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 2022 ; Vol. 136. pp. 505-523.

Bibtex

@article{e067bee5868445899483b96b1191e982,
title = "Overcoming coordination failure in games with focal points: An experimental investigation",
abstract = "We experimentally test whether increasing the salience of payoff-irrelevant focal points (schelling,1960) can counteract the negative impact of conflicts of interest on coordination. The intuition is that, in the presence of conflict, the solution to the coordination dilemma offered by the focal point loses importance. Increasing its salience increases its relevance and, therefore, coordination success. When we vary label salience between subjects, we find support for this conjecture in games with a constant degree of conflict, similar to battle of the sexes games, but not in games that feature outcomes with different degrees of payoff inequality and efficiency. In an additional experiment in which we vary label salience within subjects, choices are found not to be affected by our salience manipulation. Yet, the proportion of choices consistent with the focal point is significantly greater than that in the between-subject design. ",
keywords = "Coordination games, Focal points, Salience, Conflict of interest, Battle-of-the-sexes",
author = "{Rojo Arjona}, David and Stefania Sitzia and Jiwei Zheng",
year = "2022",
month = nov,
day = "30",
doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.010",
language = "English",
volume = "136",
pages = "505--523",
journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",
issn = "0899-8256",
publisher = "ELSEVIER ACADEMIC PRESS INC",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Overcoming coordination failure in games with focal points

T2 - An experimental investigation

AU - Rojo Arjona, David

AU - Sitzia, Stefania

AU - Zheng, Jiwei

PY - 2022/11/30

Y1 - 2022/11/30

N2 - We experimentally test whether increasing the salience of payoff-irrelevant focal points (schelling,1960) can counteract the negative impact of conflicts of interest on coordination. The intuition is that, in the presence of conflict, the solution to the coordination dilemma offered by the focal point loses importance. Increasing its salience increases its relevance and, therefore, coordination success. When we vary label salience between subjects, we find support for this conjecture in games with a constant degree of conflict, similar to battle of the sexes games, but not in games that feature outcomes with different degrees of payoff inequality and efficiency. In an additional experiment in which we vary label salience within subjects, choices are found not to be affected by our salience manipulation. Yet, the proportion of choices consistent with the focal point is significantly greater than that in the between-subject design.

AB - We experimentally test whether increasing the salience of payoff-irrelevant focal points (schelling,1960) can counteract the negative impact of conflicts of interest on coordination. The intuition is that, in the presence of conflict, the solution to the coordination dilemma offered by the focal point loses importance. Increasing its salience increases its relevance and, therefore, coordination success. When we vary label salience between subjects, we find support for this conjecture in games with a constant degree of conflict, similar to battle of the sexes games, but not in games that feature outcomes with different degrees of payoff inequality and efficiency. In an additional experiment in which we vary label salience within subjects, choices are found not to be affected by our salience manipulation. Yet, the proportion of choices consistent with the focal point is significantly greater than that in the between-subject design.

KW - Coordination games

KW - Focal points

KW - Salience

KW - Conflict of interest

KW - Battle-of-the-sexes

U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.010

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.010

M3 - Journal article

VL - 136

SP - 505

EP - 523

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

SN - 0899-8256

ER -