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Partial privatization in a mixed oligopoly with an R&D rivalry

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Partial privatization in a mixed oligopoly with an R&D rivalry. / Heywood, John; Ye, Guangliang.
In: Bulletin of Economic Research, Vol. 61, No. 2, 04.2009, p. 165-178.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Heywood, J & Ye, G 2009, 'Partial privatization in a mixed oligopoly with an R&D rivalry', Bulletin of Economic Research, vol. 61, no. 2, pp. 165-178. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8586.2008.00301.x

APA

Heywood, J., & Ye, G. (2009). Partial privatization in a mixed oligopoly with an R&D rivalry. Bulletin of Economic Research, 61(2), 165-178. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8586.2008.00301.x

Vancouver

Heywood J, Ye G. Partial privatization in a mixed oligopoly with an R&D rivalry. Bulletin of Economic Research. 2009 Apr;61(2):165-178. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8586.2008.00301.x

Author

Heywood, John ; Ye, Guangliang. / Partial privatization in a mixed oligopoly with an R&D rivalry. In: Bulletin of Economic Research. 2009 ; Vol. 61, No. 2. pp. 165-178.

Bibtex

@article{ad48d73e4121421e9499c8321aadc3db,
title = "Partial privatization in a mixed oligopoly with an R&D rivalry",
abstract = "This paper is the first to examine the incentive for partial privatization in a mixed duopoly with R&D rivalry. We show that because mixed duopolies engage in more R&D, the optimal extent of privatization is unambiguously reduced. Yet, this reduction is often very modest. Adopting the extent of privatization that would be optimal if one ignored the R&D rivalry routinely results in greater welfare than retaining a fully public firm and ignoring partial privatization. Only when R&D has an extremely low cost would it be preferable to ignore partial privatization.",
keywords = "mixed duopoly, public enterprise, research and development and partial privatization",
author = "John Heywood and Guangliang Ye",
year = "2009",
month = apr,
doi = "10.1111/j.1467-8586.2008.00301.x",
language = "English",
volume = "61",
pages = "165--178",
journal = "Bulletin of Economic Research",
issn = "0307-3378",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Partial privatization in a mixed oligopoly with an R&D rivalry

AU - Heywood, John

AU - Ye, Guangliang

PY - 2009/4

Y1 - 2009/4

N2 - This paper is the first to examine the incentive for partial privatization in a mixed duopoly with R&D rivalry. We show that because mixed duopolies engage in more R&D, the optimal extent of privatization is unambiguously reduced. Yet, this reduction is often very modest. Adopting the extent of privatization that would be optimal if one ignored the R&D rivalry routinely results in greater welfare than retaining a fully public firm and ignoring partial privatization. Only when R&D has an extremely low cost would it be preferable to ignore partial privatization.

AB - This paper is the first to examine the incentive for partial privatization in a mixed duopoly with R&D rivalry. We show that because mixed duopolies engage in more R&D, the optimal extent of privatization is unambiguously reduced. Yet, this reduction is often very modest. Adopting the extent of privatization that would be optimal if one ignored the R&D rivalry routinely results in greater welfare than retaining a fully public firm and ignoring partial privatization. Only when R&D has an extremely low cost would it be preferable to ignore partial privatization.

KW - mixed duopoly

KW - public enterprise

KW - research and development and partial privatization

U2 - 10.1111/j.1467-8586.2008.00301.x

DO - 10.1111/j.1467-8586.2008.00301.x

M3 - Journal article

VL - 61

SP - 165

EP - 178

JO - Bulletin of Economic Research

JF - Bulletin of Economic Research

SN - 0307-3378

IS - 2

ER -