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Paying for performance: Efficiency wages and mutuality

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Paying for performance: Efficiency wages and mutuality. / Ingham, Hilary; Thompson, Steve.
In: Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 15, No. 4, 31.07.1994, p. 279-289.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Ingham, H & Thompson, S 1994, 'Paying for performance: Efficiency wages and mutuality', Managerial and Decision Economics, vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 279-289. https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4090150403

APA

Ingham, H., & Thompson, S. (1994). Paying for performance: Efficiency wages and mutuality. Managerial and Decision Economics, 15(4), 279-289. https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4090150403

Vancouver

Ingham H, Thompson S. Paying for performance: Efficiency wages and mutuality. Managerial and Decision Economics. 1994 Jul 31;15(4):279-289. doi: 10.1002/mde.4090150403

Author

Ingham, Hilary ; Thompson, Steve. / Paying for performance : Efficiency wages and mutuality. In: Managerial and Decision Economics. 1994 ; Vol. 15, No. 4. pp. 279-289.

Bibtex

@article{9e0f2d0f6f364ca68d5399beaaa6cf2c,
title = "Paying for performance: Efficiency wages and mutuality",
abstract = "The motivation of individuals lies at the core of corporate governance. For CEOs much research has been directed at the linkage between pay and enterprise performance. The results, however, provide only weak support for the efficacy of profit‐related pay. Herein we adopt a different perspective and test for the existence of efficiency wages in a mutual sector wherein the use of traditional control mechanisms is particularly problematic. Our empirical results support the hypothesis that efficiency wages do yield superior performance. We therefore conclude that efficiency wages are a much‐needed tool of corporate governance in the mutual sector. Furthermore, as an incentive mechanism, efficiency wages do not require the observability of individual effort, thus they potentially provide an equitable incentive mechanism for all organizations.",
author = "Hilary Ingham and Steve Thompson",
year = "1994",
month = jul,
day = "31",
doi = "10.1002/mde.4090150403",
language = "English",
volume = "15",
pages = "279--289",
journal = "Managerial and Decision Economics",
issn = "0143-6570",
publisher = "John Wiley and Sons Ltd",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Paying for performance

T2 - Efficiency wages and mutuality

AU - Ingham, Hilary

AU - Thompson, Steve

PY - 1994/7/31

Y1 - 1994/7/31

N2 - The motivation of individuals lies at the core of corporate governance. For CEOs much research has been directed at the linkage between pay and enterprise performance. The results, however, provide only weak support for the efficacy of profit‐related pay. Herein we adopt a different perspective and test for the existence of efficiency wages in a mutual sector wherein the use of traditional control mechanisms is particularly problematic. Our empirical results support the hypothesis that efficiency wages do yield superior performance. We therefore conclude that efficiency wages are a much‐needed tool of corporate governance in the mutual sector. Furthermore, as an incentive mechanism, efficiency wages do not require the observability of individual effort, thus they potentially provide an equitable incentive mechanism for all organizations.

AB - The motivation of individuals lies at the core of corporate governance. For CEOs much research has been directed at the linkage between pay and enterprise performance. The results, however, provide only weak support for the efficacy of profit‐related pay. Herein we adopt a different perspective and test for the existence of efficiency wages in a mutual sector wherein the use of traditional control mechanisms is particularly problematic. Our empirical results support the hypothesis that efficiency wages do yield superior performance. We therefore conclude that efficiency wages are a much‐needed tool of corporate governance in the mutual sector. Furthermore, as an incentive mechanism, efficiency wages do not require the observability of individual effort, thus they potentially provide an equitable incentive mechanism for all organizations.

U2 - 10.1002/mde.4090150403

DO - 10.1002/mde.4090150403

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:84986805659

VL - 15

SP - 279

EP - 289

JO - Managerial and Decision Economics

JF - Managerial and Decision Economics

SN - 0143-6570

IS - 4

ER -