Home > Research > Publications & Outputs > Performance pay, risk attitudes and job satisfa...
View graph of relations

Performance pay, risk attitudes and job satisfaction

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Published

Standard

Performance pay, risk attitudes and job satisfaction. / Cornelissen, Thomas; Heywood, John; Jirjahn, Uwe.
In: Labour Economics, Vol. 18, No. 2, 04.2011, p. 229-239.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Cornelissen, T, Heywood, J & Jirjahn, U 2011, 'Performance pay, risk attitudes and job satisfaction', Labour Economics, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 229-239. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2010.09.005

APA

Cornelissen, T., Heywood, J., & Jirjahn, U. (2011). Performance pay, risk attitudes and job satisfaction. Labour Economics, 18(2), 229-239. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2010.09.005

Vancouver

Cornelissen T, Heywood J, Jirjahn U. Performance pay, risk attitudes and job satisfaction. Labour Economics. 2011 Apr;18(2):229-239. doi: 10.1016/j.labeco.2010.09.005

Author

Cornelissen, Thomas ; Heywood, John ; Jirjahn, Uwe. / Performance pay, risk attitudes and job satisfaction. In: Labour Economics. 2011 ; Vol. 18, No. 2. pp. 229-239.

Bibtex

@article{3bca6813fe3843eebeeeda0aa7487074,
title = "Performance pay, risk attitudes and job satisfaction",
abstract = "We present a model in which workers with greater ability and greater risk tolerance move into performance pay jobs to capture rents and contrast it with the classic agency model. Estimates from the German Socio-Economic Panel confirm testable implications drawn from our model. First, before controlling for earnings, workers in performance pay jobs have higher job satisfaction, a proxy for on-the-job utility. Second, after controlling for earnings, workers in jobs with performance pay have the same job satisfaction as those not in such jobs. Third, those workers in performance pay jobs who have greater risk tolerance routinely report greater job satisfaction. While these findings support models in which workers capture rent, they would not be suggested by the classic agency model.",
keywords = "Performance pay, Worker heterogeneity , Ability , Risk preferences , Sorting",
author = "Thomas Cornelissen and John Heywood and Uwe Jirjahn",
year = "2011",
month = apr,
doi = "10.1016/j.labeco.2010.09.005",
language = "English",
volume = "18",
pages = "229--239",
journal = "Labour Economics",
issn = "0927-5371",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Performance pay, risk attitudes and job satisfaction

AU - Cornelissen, Thomas

AU - Heywood, John

AU - Jirjahn, Uwe

PY - 2011/4

Y1 - 2011/4

N2 - We present a model in which workers with greater ability and greater risk tolerance move into performance pay jobs to capture rents and contrast it with the classic agency model. Estimates from the German Socio-Economic Panel confirm testable implications drawn from our model. First, before controlling for earnings, workers in performance pay jobs have higher job satisfaction, a proxy for on-the-job utility. Second, after controlling for earnings, workers in jobs with performance pay have the same job satisfaction as those not in such jobs. Third, those workers in performance pay jobs who have greater risk tolerance routinely report greater job satisfaction. While these findings support models in which workers capture rent, they would not be suggested by the classic agency model.

AB - We present a model in which workers with greater ability and greater risk tolerance move into performance pay jobs to capture rents and contrast it with the classic agency model. Estimates from the German Socio-Economic Panel confirm testable implications drawn from our model. First, before controlling for earnings, workers in performance pay jobs have higher job satisfaction, a proxy for on-the-job utility. Second, after controlling for earnings, workers in jobs with performance pay have the same job satisfaction as those not in such jobs. Third, those workers in performance pay jobs who have greater risk tolerance routinely report greater job satisfaction. While these findings support models in which workers capture rent, they would not be suggested by the classic agency model.

KW - Performance pay

KW - Worker heterogeneity

KW - Ability

KW - Risk preferences

KW - Sorting

U2 - 10.1016/j.labeco.2010.09.005

DO - 10.1016/j.labeco.2010.09.005

M3 - Journal article

VL - 18

SP - 229

EP - 239

JO - Labour Economics

JF - Labour Economics

SN - 0927-5371

IS - 2

ER -