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Police Militarization and Local Sheriff Elections

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Police Militarization and Local Sheriff Elections. / Mavridis, Christos; Troumpounis, Orestis; Zanardi, Maurizio.
In: The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 21.02.2024.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Mavridis, C, Troumpounis, O & Zanardi, M 2024, 'Police Militarization and Local Sheriff Elections', The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewae004

APA

Mavridis, C., Troumpounis, O., & Zanardi, M. (2024). Police Militarization and Local Sheriff Elections. The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewae004

Vancouver

Mavridis C, Troumpounis O, Zanardi M. Police Militarization and Local Sheriff Elections. The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 2024 Feb 21. Epub 2024 Feb 21. doi: 10.1093/jleo/ewae004

Author

Mavridis, Christos ; Troumpounis, Orestis ; Zanardi, Maurizio. / Police Militarization and Local Sheriff Elections. In: The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 2024.

Bibtex

@article{01572a6e0aa04201a7abccb0b6efbb57,
title = "Police Militarization and Local Sheriff Elections",
abstract = "We investigate how transfers of military equipment in the United States through the 1033 Program impact the electoral performance of sheriffs that receive a significant share of equipment while directly accountable to voters. To address this question, we have compiled a unique dataset covering 7281 sheriff elections in 2714 counties between 2006 and 2016. Our findings indicate that an increase in military transfers to the sheriff{\textquoteright}s office, from no transfers to the 25th percentile, increases the probability of the incumbent being reelected by 5.8–12.5 percentage points. This is due to an increase in the number of votes cast for the incumbent while there is no effect on the total number of voters participating in the election. Our heterogeneity results demonstrate that voters tend to reward military equipment transfers, especially when local newspapers are present and in Republican-leaning small counties, providing novel insights into voter responsiveness in local elections (JEL D72, H56, H76, K42).",
author = "Christos Mavridis and Orestis Troumpounis and Maurizio Zanardi",
year = "2024",
month = feb,
day = "21",
doi = "10.1093/jleo/ewae004",
language = "English",
journal = "The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization",
issn = "8756-6222",
publisher = "Oxford University Press",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Police Militarization and Local Sheriff Elections

AU - Mavridis, Christos

AU - Troumpounis, Orestis

AU - Zanardi, Maurizio

PY - 2024/2/21

Y1 - 2024/2/21

N2 - We investigate how transfers of military equipment in the United States through the 1033 Program impact the electoral performance of sheriffs that receive a significant share of equipment while directly accountable to voters. To address this question, we have compiled a unique dataset covering 7281 sheriff elections in 2714 counties between 2006 and 2016. Our findings indicate that an increase in military transfers to the sheriff’s office, from no transfers to the 25th percentile, increases the probability of the incumbent being reelected by 5.8–12.5 percentage points. This is due to an increase in the number of votes cast for the incumbent while there is no effect on the total number of voters participating in the election. Our heterogeneity results demonstrate that voters tend to reward military equipment transfers, especially when local newspapers are present and in Republican-leaning small counties, providing novel insights into voter responsiveness in local elections (JEL D72, H56, H76, K42).

AB - We investigate how transfers of military equipment in the United States through the 1033 Program impact the electoral performance of sheriffs that receive a significant share of equipment while directly accountable to voters. To address this question, we have compiled a unique dataset covering 7281 sheriff elections in 2714 counties between 2006 and 2016. Our findings indicate that an increase in military transfers to the sheriff’s office, from no transfers to the 25th percentile, increases the probability of the incumbent being reelected by 5.8–12.5 percentage points. This is due to an increase in the number of votes cast for the incumbent while there is no effect on the total number of voters participating in the election. Our heterogeneity results demonstrate that voters tend to reward military equipment transfers, especially when local newspapers are present and in Republican-leaning small counties, providing novel insights into voter responsiveness in local elections (JEL D72, H56, H76, K42).

U2 - 10.1093/jleo/ewae004

DO - 10.1093/jleo/ewae004

M3 - Journal article

JO - The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

JF - The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

SN - 8756-6222

ER -