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Political Competition, Tax Salience and Accountability: Theory and Some Evidence from Italy

Research output: Working paper › Discussion paper

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Political Competition, Tax Salience and Accountability: Theory and Some Evidence from Italy. / Bracco, Emanuele; Porcelli, Francesco; Redoano, Michela.
CES Ifo, 2015. p. 1-43.

Research output: Working paper › Discussion paper

Harvard

Bracco, E, Porcelli, F & Redoano, M 2015 'Political Competition, Tax Salience and Accountability: Theory and Some Evidence from Italy' CES Ifo, pp. 1-43. <https://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps/_4167.html>

APA

Bracco, E., Porcelli, F., & Redoano, M. (2015). Political Competition, Tax Salience and Accountability: Theory and Some Evidence from Italy. (pp. 1-43). CES Ifo. https://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps/_4167.html

Vancouver

Bracco E, Porcelli F, Redoano M. Political Competition, Tax Salience and Accountability: Theory and Some Evidence from Italy. CES Ifo. 2015, p. 1-43.

Author

Bracco, Emanuele ; Porcelli, Francesco ; Redoano, Michela. / Political Competition, Tax Salience and Accountability : Theory and Some Evidence from Italy. CES Ifo, 2015. pp. 1-43

Bibtex

@techreport{80dd741477a9493681266715d0947480,
title = "Political Competition, Tax Salience and Accountability: Theory and Some Evidence from Italy",
abstract = "This paper argues that high political competition does not necessarily induce policy makers to perform better as previous research has shown. We develop a political economy model and we show that when political competition is tight, and elected politicians can rely on more tax instruments, they will substitute salient taxes with less salient ones, which are not necessarily preferable. These predictions are largely confirmed using a dataset on Italian municipal elections and taxes.",
author = "Emanuele Bracco and Francesco Porcelli and Michela Redoano",
year = "2015",
language = "English",
pages = "1--43",
publisher = "CES Ifo",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "CES Ifo",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Political Competition, Tax Salience and Accountability

T2 - Theory and Some Evidence from Italy

AU - Bracco, Emanuele

AU - Porcelli, Francesco

AU - Redoano, Michela

PY - 2015

Y1 - 2015

N2 - This paper argues that high political competition does not necessarily induce policy makers to perform better as previous research has shown. We develop a political economy model and we show that when political competition is tight, and elected politicians can rely on more tax instruments, they will substitute salient taxes with less salient ones, which are not necessarily preferable. These predictions are largely confirmed using a dataset on Italian municipal elections and taxes.

AB - This paper argues that high political competition does not necessarily induce policy makers to perform better as previous research has shown. We develop a political economy model and we show that when political competition is tight, and elected politicians can rely on more tax instruments, they will substitute salient taxes with less salient ones, which are not necessarily preferable. These predictions are largely confirmed using a dataset on Italian municipal elections and taxes.

M3 - Discussion paper

SP - 1

EP - 43

BT - Political Competition, Tax Salience and Accountability

PB - CES Ifo

ER -