Final published version, 268 KB, PDF document
Research output: Working paper
Research output: Working paper
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TY - UNPB
T1 - Price level targeting with strategic fiscal policy and the value of fiscal leadership
AU - Bai, Yuting
PY - 2014
Y1 - 2014
N2 - This paper investigate the stabilization bias that arises in a model of non-cooperative monetary and fiscal policy stabilisation of the economy, when monetary authority implements price level targeting but fiscal policy remains benevolent. We demonstrate the gain in welfare improvement depends on the level of steady state debt. If the steady state level of the government debt is low, then the monetary price level targeting unambiguously leads to social welfare gains, even if the fiscal authority acts strategically and faces different objectives and has incentives to pursue its own benefit and therefore offsets some or all of monetary policy actions. Moreover, if the fiscal policymaker is able to conduct itself as an intra-period leader, the social welfare gain of the monetary price level targeting regime can be further improved. However, if the economy has a high steady state debt level, the gain of the price level targeting is outweighed by the loss arising from the conflicts between the policy makers, and leads to a lower social welfare than under cooperative discretionary inflation targeting.
AB - This paper investigate the stabilization bias that arises in a model of non-cooperative monetary and fiscal policy stabilisation of the economy, when monetary authority implements price level targeting but fiscal policy remains benevolent. We demonstrate the gain in welfare improvement depends on the level of steady state debt. If the steady state level of the government debt is low, then the monetary price level targeting unambiguously leads to social welfare gains, even if the fiscal authority acts strategically and faces different objectives and has incentives to pursue its own benefit and therefore offsets some or all of monetary policy actions. Moreover, if the fiscal policymaker is able to conduct itself as an intra-period leader, the social welfare gain of the monetary price level targeting regime can be further improved. However, if the economy has a high steady state debt level, the gain of the price level targeting is outweighed by the loss arising from the conflicts between the policy makers, and leads to a lower social welfare than under cooperative discretionary inflation targeting.
KW - Monetary and fiscal policy interactions
KW - distortionary taxes
KW - discretionary policy
KW - LQ RE models
M3 - Working paper
T3 - Economics Working Paper Series
BT - Price level targeting with strategic fiscal policy and the value of fiscal leadership
PB - Lancaster University, Department of Economics
CY - Lancaster
ER -