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Promises, pitfalls and shortfalls of the guaranteed maximum price approach: A comparative case study

Research output: Contribution in Book/Report/Proceedings - With ISBN/ISSNConference contribution/Paperpeer-review

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Promises, pitfalls and shortfalls of the guaranteed maximum price approach: A comparative case study. / Anvuur, Aaron M.; Kumaraswamy, Mohan K.
Association of Researchers in Construction Management, ARCOM 2010 - Proceedings of the 26th Annual Conference. 2010. p. 1079-1088 (Association of Researchers in Construction Management, ARCOM 2010 - Proceedings of the 26th Annual Conference).

Research output: Contribution in Book/Report/Proceedings - With ISBN/ISSNConference contribution/Paperpeer-review

Harvard

Anvuur, AM & Kumaraswamy, MK 2010, Promises, pitfalls and shortfalls of the guaranteed maximum price approach: A comparative case study. in Association of Researchers in Construction Management, ARCOM 2010 - Proceedings of the 26th Annual Conference. Association of Researchers in Construction Management, ARCOM 2010 - Proceedings of the 26th Annual Conference, pp. 1079-1088, 26th Annual Conference of the Association of Researchers in Construction Management, ARCOM 2010, Leeds, United Kingdom, 6/09/10. <https://www.arcom.ac.uk/-docs/proceedings/ar2010-1079-1088_Anvuur_and_Kumaraswamy.pdf>

APA

Anvuur, A. M., & Kumaraswamy, M. K. (2010). Promises, pitfalls and shortfalls of the guaranteed maximum price approach: A comparative case study. In Association of Researchers in Construction Management, ARCOM 2010 - Proceedings of the 26th Annual Conference (pp. 1079-1088). (Association of Researchers in Construction Management, ARCOM 2010 - Proceedings of the 26th Annual Conference). https://www.arcom.ac.uk/-docs/proceedings/ar2010-1079-1088_Anvuur_and_Kumaraswamy.pdf

Vancouver

Anvuur AM, Kumaraswamy MK. Promises, pitfalls and shortfalls of the guaranteed maximum price approach: A comparative case study. In Association of Researchers in Construction Management, ARCOM 2010 - Proceedings of the 26th Annual Conference. 2010. p. 1079-1088. (Association of Researchers in Construction Management, ARCOM 2010 - Proceedings of the 26th Annual Conference).

Author

Anvuur, Aaron M. ; Kumaraswamy, Mohan K. / Promises, pitfalls and shortfalls of the guaranteed maximum price approach : A comparative case study. Association of Researchers in Construction Management, ARCOM 2010 - Proceedings of the 26th Annual Conference. 2010. pp. 1079-1088 (Association of Researchers in Construction Management, ARCOM 2010 - Proceedings of the 26th Annual Conference).

Bibtex

@inproceedings{afa6ef3b78e74a0eb33b1f4d896a8975,
title = "Promises, pitfalls and shortfalls of the guaranteed maximum price approach: A comparative case study",
abstract = "The relative merits of the guaranteed maximum price (GMP) mechanism as a contractual incentive in construction have been much contested. This question was investigated using a comparative case study of two building projects in Hong Kong. Data was collected through semi-structured interviews, review of project documentation and communications, and passive observation of project meetings. The findings suggest that the GMP mechanism has low incentive intensity from an instrumental rationality perspective and high incentive intensity from a value-expressive perspective. Further analysis of the findings leads to two main conclusions about the potential value of the GMP mechanism to a client: (a) it can provide some flexibility in responding to short-term market changes and other idiosyncratic factors and (b) it can be a useful instrument for project work group integration. Based on current approaches to GMP projects in Hong Kong, the ultimate compensation for the additional risk transfer to the contractor should come from the applied mark up or fee rather than any expectation or possibility of financial reward for net cost savings.",
keywords = "Contract strategy, Guaranteed maximum price, Incentivization",
author = "Anvuur, {Aaron M.} and Kumaraswamy, {Mohan K.}",
year = "2010",
month = sep,
day = "6",
language = "English",
isbn = "0955239044",
series = "Association of Researchers in Construction Management, ARCOM 2010 - Proceedings of the 26th Annual Conference",
pages = "1079--1088",
booktitle = "Association of Researchers in Construction Management, ARCOM 2010 - Proceedings of the 26th Annual Conference",
note = "26th Annual Conference of the Association of Researchers in Construction Management, ARCOM 2010 ; Conference date: 06-09-2010 Through 08-09-2010",

}

RIS

TY - GEN

T1 - Promises, pitfalls and shortfalls of the guaranteed maximum price approach

T2 - 26th Annual Conference of the Association of Researchers in Construction Management, ARCOM 2010

AU - Anvuur, Aaron M.

AU - Kumaraswamy, Mohan K.

PY - 2010/9/6

Y1 - 2010/9/6

N2 - The relative merits of the guaranteed maximum price (GMP) mechanism as a contractual incentive in construction have been much contested. This question was investigated using a comparative case study of two building projects in Hong Kong. Data was collected through semi-structured interviews, review of project documentation and communications, and passive observation of project meetings. The findings suggest that the GMP mechanism has low incentive intensity from an instrumental rationality perspective and high incentive intensity from a value-expressive perspective. Further analysis of the findings leads to two main conclusions about the potential value of the GMP mechanism to a client: (a) it can provide some flexibility in responding to short-term market changes and other idiosyncratic factors and (b) it can be a useful instrument for project work group integration. Based on current approaches to GMP projects in Hong Kong, the ultimate compensation for the additional risk transfer to the contractor should come from the applied mark up or fee rather than any expectation or possibility of financial reward for net cost savings.

AB - The relative merits of the guaranteed maximum price (GMP) mechanism as a contractual incentive in construction have been much contested. This question was investigated using a comparative case study of two building projects in Hong Kong. Data was collected through semi-structured interviews, review of project documentation and communications, and passive observation of project meetings. The findings suggest that the GMP mechanism has low incentive intensity from an instrumental rationality perspective and high incentive intensity from a value-expressive perspective. Further analysis of the findings leads to two main conclusions about the potential value of the GMP mechanism to a client: (a) it can provide some flexibility in responding to short-term market changes and other idiosyncratic factors and (b) it can be a useful instrument for project work group integration. Based on current approaches to GMP projects in Hong Kong, the ultimate compensation for the additional risk transfer to the contractor should come from the applied mark up or fee rather than any expectation or possibility of financial reward for net cost savings.

KW - Contract strategy

KW - Guaranteed maximum price

KW - Incentivization

M3 - Conference contribution/Paper

AN - SCOPUS:84858691964

SN - 0955239044

SN - 9780955239045

T3 - Association of Researchers in Construction Management, ARCOM 2010 - Proceedings of the 26th Annual Conference

SP - 1079

EP - 1088

BT - Association of Researchers in Construction Management, ARCOM 2010 - Proceedings of the 26th Annual Conference

Y2 - 6 September 2010 through 8 September 2010

ER -