Final published version
Research output: Contribution in Book/Report/Proceedings - With ISBN/ISSN › Conference contribution/Paper › peer-review
Research output: Contribution in Book/Report/Proceedings - With ISBN/ISSN › Conference contribution/Paper › peer-review
}
TY - GEN
T1 - Promises, pitfalls and shortfalls of the guaranteed maximum price approach
T2 - 26th Annual Conference of the Association of Researchers in Construction Management, ARCOM 2010
AU - Anvuur, Aaron M.
AU - Kumaraswamy, Mohan K.
PY - 2010/9/6
Y1 - 2010/9/6
N2 - The relative merits of the guaranteed maximum price (GMP) mechanism as a contractual incentive in construction have been much contested. This question was investigated using a comparative case study of two building projects in Hong Kong. Data was collected through semi-structured interviews, review of project documentation and communications, and passive observation of project meetings. The findings suggest that the GMP mechanism has low incentive intensity from an instrumental rationality perspective and high incentive intensity from a value-expressive perspective. Further analysis of the findings leads to two main conclusions about the potential value of the GMP mechanism to a client: (a) it can provide some flexibility in responding to short-term market changes and other idiosyncratic factors and (b) it can be a useful instrument for project work group integration. Based on current approaches to GMP projects in Hong Kong, the ultimate compensation for the additional risk transfer to the contractor should come from the applied mark up or fee rather than any expectation or possibility of financial reward for net cost savings.
AB - The relative merits of the guaranteed maximum price (GMP) mechanism as a contractual incentive in construction have been much contested. This question was investigated using a comparative case study of two building projects in Hong Kong. Data was collected through semi-structured interviews, review of project documentation and communications, and passive observation of project meetings. The findings suggest that the GMP mechanism has low incentive intensity from an instrumental rationality perspective and high incentive intensity from a value-expressive perspective. Further analysis of the findings leads to two main conclusions about the potential value of the GMP mechanism to a client: (a) it can provide some flexibility in responding to short-term market changes and other idiosyncratic factors and (b) it can be a useful instrument for project work group integration. Based on current approaches to GMP projects in Hong Kong, the ultimate compensation for the additional risk transfer to the contractor should come from the applied mark up or fee rather than any expectation or possibility of financial reward for net cost savings.
KW - Contract strategy
KW - Guaranteed maximum price
KW - Incentivization
M3 - Conference contribution/Paper
AN - SCOPUS:84858691964
SN - 0955239044
SN - 9780955239045
T3 - Association of Researchers in Construction Management, ARCOM 2010 - Proceedings of the 26th Annual Conference
SP - 1079
EP - 1088
BT - Association of Researchers in Construction Management, ARCOM 2010 - Proceedings of the 26th Annual Conference
Y2 - 6 September 2010 through 8 September 2010
ER -