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    Rights statement: The final publication is available at Springer via https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-021-00474-0

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Properties, Concepts and Empirical Identity

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

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Properties, Concepts and Empirical Identity. / Unwin, N.
In: Acta Analytica, Vol. 37, No. 2, 30.06.2022, p. 159-171.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Unwin, N 2022, 'Properties, Concepts and Empirical Identity', Acta Analytica, vol. 37, no. 2, pp. 159-171. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-021-00474-0

APA

Unwin, N. (2022). Properties, Concepts and Empirical Identity. Acta Analytica, 37(2), 159-171. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-021-00474-0

Vancouver

Unwin N. Properties, Concepts and Empirical Identity. Acta Analytica. 2022 Jun 30;37(2):159-171. Epub 2021 Jul 5. doi: 10.1007/s12136-021-00474-0

Author

Unwin, N. / Properties, Concepts and Empirical Identity. In: Acta Analytica. 2022 ; Vol. 37, No. 2. pp. 159-171.

Bibtex

@article{850045a3a5c9451fbb5cfd40ff15ea69,
title = "Properties, Concepts and Empirical Identity",
abstract = "Properties and concepts are similar kinds of thing in so far as they are both typically understood to be whatever it is that predicates stand for. However, they are generally supposed to have different identity criteria: for example, heat is the same property as molecular kinetic energy, whereas the concept of heat is different from the concept of molecular kinetic energy. This paper examines whether this discrepancy is really defensible, and concludes that matters are more complex than is generally thought. The distinction between canonical and non-canonical designators, as applied to such entities as propositions, properties and concepts, is examined, as are causal realist accounts of the semantics of such terms as {\textquoteleft}electricity{\textquoteright} and {\textquoteleft}mass{\textquoteright}. ",
keywords = "Concept, Identity, Kripke, Property, Putnam",
author = "N. Unwin",
note = "The final publication is available at Springer via https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-021-00474-0.",
year = "2022",
month = jun,
day = "30",
doi = "10.1007/s12136-021-00474-0",
language = "English",
volume = "37",
pages = "159--171",
journal = "Acta Analytica",
issn = "0353-5150",
publisher = "Springer Netherlands",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Properties, Concepts and Empirical Identity

AU - Unwin, N.

N1 - The final publication is available at Springer via https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-021-00474-0.

PY - 2022/6/30

Y1 - 2022/6/30

N2 - Properties and concepts are similar kinds of thing in so far as they are both typically understood to be whatever it is that predicates stand for. However, they are generally supposed to have different identity criteria: for example, heat is the same property as molecular kinetic energy, whereas the concept of heat is different from the concept of molecular kinetic energy. This paper examines whether this discrepancy is really defensible, and concludes that matters are more complex than is generally thought. The distinction between canonical and non-canonical designators, as applied to such entities as propositions, properties and concepts, is examined, as are causal realist accounts of the semantics of such terms as ‘electricity’ and ‘mass’.

AB - Properties and concepts are similar kinds of thing in so far as they are both typically understood to be whatever it is that predicates stand for. However, they are generally supposed to have different identity criteria: for example, heat is the same property as molecular kinetic energy, whereas the concept of heat is different from the concept of molecular kinetic energy. This paper examines whether this discrepancy is really defensible, and concludes that matters are more complex than is generally thought. The distinction between canonical and non-canonical designators, as applied to such entities as propositions, properties and concepts, is examined, as are causal realist accounts of the semantics of such terms as ‘electricity’ and ‘mass’.

KW - Concept

KW - Identity

KW - Kripke

KW - Property

KW - Putnam

U2 - 10.1007/s12136-021-00474-0

DO - 10.1007/s12136-021-00474-0

M3 - Journal article

VL - 37

SP - 159

EP - 171

JO - Acta Analytica

JF - Acta Analytica

SN - 0353-5150

IS - 2

ER -