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Protecting Water Utility Networks from Advanced Persistent Threats: A Case Study

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Protecting Water Utility Networks from Advanced Persistent Threats : A Case Study. / Gouglidis, Antonios; König, Sandra; Green, Benjamin; Rossegger, Karl; Hutchison, David.

Game Theory for Security and Risk Management: From Theory to Practice. ed. / Stefan Rass; Stefan Schauer. Basel : Springer Birkhäuser, 2018. p. 313-333 (Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications).

Research output: Contribution in Book/Report/Proceedings - With ISBN/ISSNOther chapter contribution

Harvard

Gouglidis, A, König, S, Green, B, Rossegger, K & Hutchison, D 2018, Protecting Water Utility Networks from Advanced Persistent Threats: A Case Study. in S Rass & S Schauer (eds), Game Theory for Security and Risk Management: From Theory to Practice. Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications, Springer Birkhäuser, Basel, pp. 313-333. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75268-6_13

APA

Gouglidis, A., König, S., Green, B., Rossegger, K., & Hutchison, D. (2018). Protecting Water Utility Networks from Advanced Persistent Threats: A Case Study. In S. Rass, & S. Schauer (Eds.), Game Theory for Security and Risk Management: From Theory to Practice (pp. 313-333). (Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications). Springer Birkhäuser. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75268-6_13

Vancouver

Gouglidis A, König S, Green B, Rossegger K, Hutchison D. Protecting Water Utility Networks from Advanced Persistent Threats: A Case Study. In Rass S, Schauer S, editors, Game Theory for Security and Risk Management: From Theory to Practice. Basel: Springer Birkhäuser. 2018. p. 313-333. (Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75268-6_13

Author

Gouglidis, Antonios ; König, Sandra ; Green, Benjamin ; Rossegger, Karl ; Hutchison, David. / Protecting Water Utility Networks from Advanced Persistent Threats : A Case Study. Game Theory for Security and Risk Management: From Theory to Practice. editor / Stefan Rass ; Stefan Schauer. Basel : Springer Birkhäuser, 2018. pp. 313-333 (Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications).

Bibtex

@inbook{e5eda54dd5374f08ae6cc3041813bb6b,
title = "Protecting Water Utility Networks from Advanced Persistent Threats: A Case Study",
abstract = "The sovereignty and wellbeing of nations is highly dependent on the continuous and uninterrupted operation of critical infrastructures. Thus, the protection of utilities that provision critical services (e.g., water, electricity, telecommunications) is of vital importance given the severity imposed by any failure of these services. Recent security incidents in the context of critical infrastructures indicate that threats in such environments appear to be increasing both in frequency and intensity. The complexity of typical critical infrastructures is among the factors that make these environments vulnerable to threats. One of the most problematic types of threat is an advanced persistent threat (an APT). This usually refers to a sophisticated, targeted, and costly attack that employs multiple attack vectors to gain access to the target system, then to operate in stealth mode when penetration is achieved, and to exfiltrate data or cause failures inside the system. In this chapter, we demonstrate how a set of processes developed in the context of HyRiM's risk management framework can assist in minimizing the damage caused to a utility organization that is subjected to an APT style of attack. Specifically, the framework is demonstrated using data from a real-world water utility network and an industrial control system (ICS) testbed, and in which optimal defensive strategies are investigated.",
author = "Antonios Gouglidis and Sandra K{\"o}nig and Benjamin Green and Karl Rossegger and David Hutchison",
year = "2018",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-319-75268-6_13",
language = "English",
isbn = "9783319752679",
series = "Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications",
publisher = "Springer Birkh{\"a}user",
pages = "313--333",
editor = "Stefan Rass and Stefan Schauer",
booktitle = "Game Theory for Security and Risk Management",

}

RIS

TY - CHAP

T1 - Protecting Water Utility Networks from Advanced Persistent Threats

T2 - A Case Study

AU - Gouglidis, Antonios

AU - König, Sandra

AU - Green, Benjamin

AU - Rossegger, Karl

AU - Hutchison, David

PY - 2018

Y1 - 2018

N2 - The sovereignty and wellbeing of nations is highly dependent on the continuous and uninterrupted operation of critical infrastructures. Thus, the protection of utilities that provision critical services (e.g., water, electricity, telecommunications) is of vital importance given the severity imposed by any failure of these services. Recent security incidents in the context of critical infrastructures indicate that threats in such environments appear to be increasing both in frequency and intensity. The complexity of typical critical infrastructures is among the factors that make these environments vulnerable to threats. One of the most problematic types of threat is an advanced persistent threat (an APT). This usually refers to a sophisticated, targeted, and costly attack that employs multiple attack vectors to gain access to the target system, then to operate in stealth mode when penetration is achieved, and to exfiltrate data or cause failures inside the system. In this chapter, we demonstrate how a set of processes developed in the context of HyRiM's risk management framework can assist in minimizing the damage caused to a utility organization that is subjected to an APT style of attack. Specifically, the framework is demonstrated using data from a real-world water utility network and an industrial control system (ICS) testbed, and in which optimal defensive strategies are investigated.

AB - The sovereignty and wellbeing of nations is highly dependent on the continuous and uninterrupted operation of critical infrastructures. Thus, the protection of utilities that provision critical services (e.g., water, electricity, telecommunications) is of vital importance given the severity imposed by any failure of these services. Recent security incidents in the context of critical infrastructures indicate that threats in such environments appear to be increasing both in frequency and intensity. The complexity of typical critical infrastructures is among the factors that make these environments vulnerable to threats. One of the most problematic types of threat is an advanced persistent threat (an APT). This usually refers to a sophisticated, targeted, and costly attack that employs multiple attack vectors to gain access to the target system, then to operate in stealth mode when penetration is achieved, and to exfiltrate data or cause failures inside the system. In this chapter, we demonstrate how a set of processes developed in the context of HyRiM's risk management framework can assist in minimizing the damage caused to a utility organization that is subjected to an APT style of attack. Specifically, the framework is demonstrated using data from a real-world water utility network and an industrial control system (ICS) testbed, and in which optimal defensive strategies are investigated.

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-319-75268-6_13

DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-75268-6_13

M3 - Other chapter contribution

SN - 9783319752679

T3 - Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications

SP - 313

EP - 333

BT - Game Theory for Security and Risk Management

A2 - Rass, Stefan

A2 - Schauer, Stefan

PB - Springer Birkhäuser

CY - Basel

ER -