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Protest voting in the laboratory

Research output: Working paper

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Protest voting in the laboratory. / Louis, Philippos; Troumpounis, Orestis; Tsakas, Nikolaos et al.
Lancaster: Lancaster University, Department of Economics, 2020. (Economics Working Papers Series).

Research output: Working paper

Harvard

Louis, P, Troumpounis, O, Tsakas, N & Xefteris, D 2020 'Protest voting in the laboratory' Economics Working Papers Series, Lancaster University, Department of Economics, Lancaster.

APA

Louis, P., Troumpounis, O., Tsakas, N., & Xefteris, D. (2020). Protest voting in the laboratory. (Economics Working Papers Series). Lancaster University, Department of Economics.

Vancouver

Louis P, Troumpounis O, Tsakas N, Xefteris D. Protest voting in the laboratory. Lancaster: Lancaster University, Department of Economics. 2020 Feb. (Economics Working Papers Series).

Author

Louis, Philippos ; Troumpounis, Orestis ; Tsakas, Nikolaos et al. / Protest voting in the laboratory. Lancaster : Lancaster University, Department of Economics, 2020. (Economics Working Papers Series).

Bibtex

@techreport{0ef83d72bc094d1db747e958e265b95b,
title = "Protest voting in the laboratory",
abstract = "Formal analysis predicts that the likelihood of an electoral accident depends on the preference intensity for a successful protest, but not on the protest's popularity: an increase in protest's popularity is fully offset by a reduction in the individual probability of casting a protest vote. By conducting the first laboratory experiment on protest voting, we find strong evidence in favor of the first prediction and qualified support for the latter. While the offset effect is present, it is not as strong as the theory predicts: protest candidates gain both by fanaticising existing protestersand by expanding the protest's popular base.",
keywords = "protest voting, electoral accident, coordination, laboratory experiment",
author = "Philippos Louis and Orestis Troumpounis and Nikolaos Tsakas and Dimitrios Xefteris",
year = "2020",
month = feb,
language = "English",
series = "Economics Working Papers Series",
publisher = "Lancaster University, Department of Economics",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Lancaster University, Department of Economics",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Protest voting in the laboratory

AU - Louis, Philippos

AU - Troumpounis, Orestis

AU - Tsakas, Nikolaos

AU - Xefteris, Dimitrios

PY - 2020/2

Y1 - 2020/2

N2 - Formal analysis predicts that the likelihood of an electoral accident depends on the preference intensity for a successful protest, but not on the protest's popularity: an increase in protest's popularity is fully offset by a reduction in the individual probability of casting a protest vote. By conducting the first laboratory experiment on protest voting, we find strong evidence in favor of the first prediction and qualified support for the latter. While the offset effect is present, it is not as strong as the theory predicts: protest candidates gain both by fanaticising existing protestersand by expanding the protest's popular base.

AB - Formal analysis predicts that the likelihood of an electoral accident depends on the preference intensity for a successful protest, but not on the protest's popularity: an increase in protest's popularity is fully offset by a reduction in the individual probability of casting a protest vote. By conducting the first laboratory experiment on protest voting, we find strong evidence in favor of the first prediction and qualified support for the latter. While the offset effect is present, it is not as strong as the theory predicts: protest candidates gain both by fanaticising existing protestersand by expanding the protest's popular base.

KW - protest voting

KW - electoral accident

KW - coordination

KW - laboratory experiment

M3 - Working paper

T3 - Economics Working Papers Series

BT - Protest voting in the laboratory

PB - Lancaster University, Department of Economics

CY - Lancaster

ER -