Home > Research > Publications & Outputs > Psychiatric classification and subjective exper...

Electronic data

  • authorsfinalcooper

    Rights statement: The final, definitive version of this article has been published in the Journal, Emotion Review, 4 (2), 2012, © SAGE Publications Ltd, 2012 by SAGE Publications Ltd at the Emotion Review page: http://emr.sagepub.com/ on SAGE Journals Online: http://online.sagepub.com/

    Accepted author manuscript, 64 KB, PDF document

Links

Text available via DOI:

View graph of relations

Psychiatric classification and subjective experience

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Published

Standard

Psychiatric classification and subjective experience. / Cooper, Rachel.
In: Emotion Review, Vol. 4, No. 2, 04.2012, p. 197-202.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

APA

Vancouver

Cooper R. Psychiatric classification and subjective experience. Emotion Review. 2012 Apr;4(2):197-202. doi: 10.1177/1754073911430139

Author

Cooper, Rachel. / Psychiatric classification and subjective experience. In: Emotion Review. 2012 ; Vol. 4, No. 2. pp. 197-202.

Bibtex

@article{ea218f545ef64d2fa52dc13244bfa333,
title = "Psychiatric classification and subjective experience",
abstract = "This article does not directly consider the feelings and emotions that occur in mental illness. Rather, it concerns a higher level methodological question: To what extent is an analysis of feelings and felt emotions of importance for psychiatric classification? Some claim that producing a phenomenologically informed descriptive psychopathology is a prerequisite for serious taxonomic endeavor. Others think that classifications of mental disorders may ignore subjective experience. A middle view holds that classification should at least map the contours of the phenomenology of mental illness. This article examines these options. I conclude that it is not true that phenomenology is a logical prerequisite for classification, nor even that classification should necessarily respect phenomenological boundaries, but that detailed phenomenological examination can sometimes inform classification.",
keywords = "classification, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, international classification of diseases, phenomenology, Subjective experience",
author = "Rachel Cooper",
note = "The final, definitive version of this article has been published in the Journal, Emotion Review, 4 (2), 2012, {\textcopyright} SAGE Publications Ltd, 2012 by SAGE Publications Ltd at the Emotion Review page: http://emr.sagepub.com/ on SAGE Journals Online: http://online.sagepub.com/ ",
year = "2012",
month = apr,
doi = "10.1177/1754073911430139",
language = "English",
volume = "4",
pages = "197--202",
journal = "Emotion Review",
issn = "1754-0747",
publisher = "SAGE Publications Ltd",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Psychiatric classification and subjective experience

AU - Cooper, Rachel

N1 - The final, definitive version of this article has been published in the Journal, Emotion Review, 4 (2), 2012, © SAGE Publications Ltd, 2012 by SAGE Publications Ltd at the Emotion Review page: http://emr.sagepub.com/ on SAGE Journals Online: http://online.sagepub.com/

PY - 2012/4

Y1 - 2012/4

N2 - This article does not directly consider the feelings and emotions that occur in mental illness. Rather, it concerns a higher level methodological question: To what extent is an analysis of feelings and felt emotions of importance for psychiatric classification? Some claim that producing a phenomenologically informed descriptive psychopathology is a prerequisite for serious taxonomic endeavor. Others think that classifications of mental disorders may ignore subjective experience. A middle view holds that classification should at least map the contours of the phenomenology of mental illness. This article examines these options. I conclude that it is not true that phenomenology is a logical prerequisite for classification, nor even that classification should necessarily respect phenomenological boundaries, but that detailed phenomenological examination can sometimes inform classification.

AB - This article does not directly consider the feelings and emotions that occur in mental illness. Rather, it concerns a higher level methodological question: To what extent is an analysis of feelings and felt emotions of importance for psychiatric classification? Some claim that producing a phenomenologically informed descriptive psychopathology is a prerequisite for serious taxonomic endeavor. Others think that classifications of mental disorders may ignore subjective experience. A middle view holds that classification should at least map the contours of the phenomenology of mental illness. This article examines these options. I conclude that it is not true that phenomenology is a logical prerequisite for classification, nor even that classification should necessarily respect phenomenological boundaries, but that detailed phenomenological examination can sometimes inform classification.

KW - classification

KW - Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders

KW - international classification of diseases

KW - phenomenology

KW - Subjective experience

U2 - 10.1177/1754073911430139

DO - 10.1177/1754073911430139

M3 - Journal article

VL - 4

SP - 197

EP - 202

JO - Emotion Review

JF - Emotion Review

SN - 1754-0747

IS - 2

ER -