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Psychosis and intersubjective epistemology

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Psychosis and intersubjective epistemology. / Maung, Hane.
In: Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2012, p. 31-41.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Maung, H 2012, 'Psychosis and intersubjective epistemology', Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 31-41. <http://www.crossingdialogues.com/Ms-A12-08.pdf>

APA

Maung, H. (2012). Psychosis and intersubjective epistemology. Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences, 5(2), 31-41. http://www.crossingdialogues.com/Ms-A12-08.pdf

Vancouver

Maung H. Psychosis and intersubjective epistemology. Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences. 2012;5(2):31-41.

Author

Maung, Hane. / Psychosis and intersubjective epistemology. In: Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences. 2012 ; Vol. 5, No. 2. pp. 31-41.

Bibtex

@article{d1a86ab738f34a8eadfe244938ac08c3,
title = "Psychosis and intersubjective epistemology",
abstract = "Delusions and hallucinations present a challenge to traditional epistemology by allowing two people{\textquoteright}s experiences of the world to be vastly different to each other. Traditional objective realism assumes that there is a mind-independent objective world of which people gain knowledge through experience. However, each person only has direct access to his or her own subjective experience of the world, and so neither can be certain that his or her experience represents an objective world more accurately than the other{\textquoteright}s. This essay proposes an intersubjective account of psychosis, which avoids this sceptical attack on objective certainty by considering reality not at the level of an objective mind-independent world, but at the level of peoples{\textquoteright} shared experiences. This intersubjective hypothesis is developed further, with reference to Husserl{\textquoteright}s concept of multiple lifeworlds, into a relativistic account. The implication on the social role of psychiatry is also explored.",
keywords = "intersubjectivity, psychopathology , phenomenology, psychiatry",
author = "Hane Maung",
year = "2012",
language = "English",
volume = "5",
pages = "31--41",
journal = "Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences",
issn = "2035-0031",
publisher = "Associazione Crossing Dialogues",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Psychosis and intersubjective epistemology

AU - Maung, Hane

PY - 2012

Y1 - 2012

N2 - Delusions and hallucinations present a challenge to traditional epistemology by allowing two people’s experiences of the world to be vastly different to each other. Traditional objective realism assumes that there is a mind-independent objective world of which people gain knowledge through experience. However, each person only has direct access to his or her own subjective experience of the world, and so neither can be certain that his or her experience represents an objective world more accurately than the other’s. This essay proposes an intersubjective account of psychosis, which avoids this sceptical attack on objective certainty by considering reality not at the level of an objective mind-independent world, but at the level of peoples’ shared experiences. This intersubjective hypothesis is developed further, with reference to Husserl’s concept of multiple lifeworlds, into a relativistic account. The implication on the social role of psychiatry is also explored.

AB - Delusions and hallucinations present a challenge to traditional epistemology by allowing two people’s experiences of the world to be vastly different to each other. Traditional objective realism assumes that there is a mind-independent objective world of which people gain knowledge through experience. However, each person only has direct access to his or her own subjective experience of the world, and so neither can be certain that his or her experience represents an objective world more accurately than the other’s. This essay proposes an intersubjective account of psychosis, which avoids this sceptical attack on objective certainty by considering reality not at the level of an objective mind-independent world, but at the level of peoples’ shared experiences. This intersubjective hypothesis is developed further, with reference to Husserl’s concept of multiple lifeworlds, into a relativistic account. The implication on the social role of psychiatry is also explored.

KW - intersubjectivity

KW - psychopathology

KW - phenomenology

KW - psychiatry

M3 - Journal article

VL - 5

SP - 31

EP - 41

JO - Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences

JF - Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences

SN - 2035-0031

IS - 2

ER -