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Public-Goods Games with Endogenous Institution-Formation: Experimental Evidence on the Effect of the Voting Rule

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

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Public-Goods Games with Endogenous Institution-Formation: Experimental Evidence on the Effect of the Voting Rule. / Funaki, Yukihiko; Li, Jiawen; Veszteg, Robert F.
In: Games, Vol. 8, No. 4, 52, 02.12.2017.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Funaki, Y, Li, J & Veszteg, RF 2017, 'Public-Goods Games with Endogenous Institution-Formation: Experimental Evidence on the Effect of the Voting Rule', Games, vol. 8, no. 4, 52. https://doi.org/10.3390/g8040052

APA

Funaki, Y., Li, J., & Veszteg, R. F. (2017). Public-Goods Games with Endogenous Institution-Formation: Experimental Evidence on the Effect of the Voting Rule. Games, 8(4), Article 52. https://doi.org/10.3390/g8040052

Vancouver

Funaki Y, Li J, Veszteg RF. Public-Goods Games with Endogenous Institution-Formation: Experimental Evidence on the Effect of the Voting Rule. Games. 2017 Dec 2;8(4):52. doi: 10.3390/g8040052

Author

Funaki, Yukihiko ; Li, Jiawen ; Veszteg, Robert F. / Public-Goods Games with Endogenous Institution-Formation : Experimental Evidence on the Effect of the Voting Rule. In: Games. 2017 ; Vol. 8, No. 4.

Bibtex

@article{2203d7b2f47e4b4785f3c805f9e4805b,
title = "Public-Goods Games with Endogenous Institution-Formation: Experimental Evidence on the Effect of the Voting Rule",
abstract = "We report experimental results on voluntary contributions to public-goods provision from situations in which parties can create institutions to impose a certain contribution level on its members. We focus on a public-goods game where the joint decisions inside the institution are made based on the plurality voting rule. We show that, comparing to the unanimity voting rule, the plurality rule results in a significant and large decrease in the institution initiation rate, along with a significant and large increase in the institution implementation rate. In the end, as the two effects cancel each other out, the choice of the voting rule does not significantly affect the average contribution level or efficiency",
keywords = "institution formation, laboratory experiment, plurality voting, public-goods game, unanimity voting",
author = "Yukihiko Funaki and Jiawen Li and Veszteg, {Robert F.}",
year = "2017",
month = dec,
day = "2",
doi = "10.3390/g8040052",
language = "English",
volume = "8",
journal = "Games",
issn = "2073-4336",
publisher = "MDPI AG",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Public-Goods Games with Endogenous Institution-Formation

T2 - Experimental Evidence on the Effect of the Voting Rule

AU - Funaki, Yukihiko

AU - Li, Jiawen

AU - Veszteg, Robert F.

PY - 2017/12/2

Y1 - 2017/12/2

N2 - We report experimental results on voluntary contributions to public-goods provision from situations in which parties can create institutions to impose a certain contribution level on its members. We focus on a public-goods game where the joint decisions inside the institution are made based on the plurality voting rule. We show that, comparing to the unanimity voting rule, the plurality rule results in a significant and large decrease in the institution initiation rate, along with a significant and large increase in the institution implementation rate. In the end, as the two effects cancel each other out, the choice of the voting rule does not significantly affect the average contribution level or efficiency

AB - We report experimental results on voluntary contributions to public-goods provision from situations in which parties can create institutions to impose a certain contribution level on its members. We focus on a public-goods game where the joint decisions inside the institution are made based on the plurality voting rule. We show that, comparing to the unanimity voting rule, the plurality rule results in a significant and large decrease in the institution initiation rate, along with a significant and large increase in the institution implementation rate. In the end, as the two effects cancel each other out, the choice of the voting rule does not significantly affect the average contribution level or efficiency

KW - institution formation

KW - laboratory experiment

KW - plurality voting

KW - public-goods game

KW - unanimity voting

U2 - 10.3390/g8040052

DO - 10.3390/g8040052

M3 - Journal article

VL - 8

JO - Games

JF - Games

SN - 2073-4336

IS - 4

M1 - 52

ER -