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Pure Russellianism.

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Pure Russellianism. / Crawford, Sean.
In: Philosophical Papers, Vol. 33, No. 2, 07.2004, p. 171-202.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Crawford, S 2004, 'Pure Russellianism.', Philosophical Papers, vol. 33, no. 2, pp. 171-202. <http://www.ajol.info/viewarticle.php?jid=190&id=21059&layout=abstract>

APA

Crawford, S. (2004). Pure Russellianism. Philosophical Papers, 33(2), 171-202. http://www.ajol.info/viewarticle.php?jid=190&id=21059&layout=abstract

Vancouver

Crawford S. Pure Russellianism. Philosophical Papers. 2004 Jul;33(2):171-202.

Author

Crawford, Sean. / Pure Russellianism. In: Philosophical Papers. 2004 ; Vol. 33, No. 2. pp. 171-202.

Bibtex

@article{ad796938f6684de5a447cfa2b7e95a42,
title = "Pure Russellianism.",
abstract = "According to Russellianism, the content of a Russellian thought, in which a person ascribes a monadic property to an object, can be represented as an ordered couple of the object and the property. A consequence of this is that it is not possible for a person to believe that a is F and not to believe b is F, when a=b. Many critics of Russellianism suppose that this is possible and thus that Russellianism is false. Several arguments for this claim are criticized and it is argued that Russellians need not appeal to representational notions in order to defeat them. Contrary to popular opinion, the prospects for a pure Russellianism, a Russellianism without representations, are in fact very good.",
author = "Sean Crawford",
year = "2004",
month = jul,
language = "English",
volume = "33",
pages = "171--202",
journal = "Philosophical Papers",
issn = "0556-8641",
publisher = "Taylor and Francis Ltd.",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Pure Russellianism.

AU - Crawford, Sean

PY - 2004/7

Y1 - 2004/7

N2 - According to Russellianism, the content of a Russellian thought, in which a person ascribes a monadic property to an object, can be represented as an ordered couple of the object and the property. A consequence of this is that it is not possible for a person to believe that a is F and not to believe b is F, when a=b. Many critics of Russellianism suppose that this is possible and thus that Russellianism is false. Several arguments for this claim are criticized and it is argued that Russellians need not appeal to representational notions in order to defeat them. Contrary to popular opinion, the prospects for a pure Russellianism, a Russellianism without representations, are in fact very good.

AB - According to Russellianism, the content of a Russellian thought, in which a person ascribes a monadic property to an object, can be represented as an ordered couple of the object and the property. A consequence of this is that it is not possible for a person to believe that a is F and not to believe b is F, when a=b. Many critics of Russellianism suppose that this is possible and thus that Russellianism is false. Several arguments for this claim are criticized and it is argued that Russellians need not appeal to representational notions in order to defeat them. Contrary to popular opinion, the prospects for a pure Russellianism, a Russellianism without representations, are in fact very good.

M3 - Journal article

VL - 33

SP - 171

EP - 202

JO - Philosophical Papers

JF - Philosophical Papers

SN - 0556-8641

IS - 2

ER -