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    Rights statement: The final, definitive version of this article has been published in the Journal, National Institute Economic Review, 232 (1), 2015, © SAGE Publications Ltd, 2015 by SAGE Publications Ltd at the National Institute Economic Review page: http://ner.sagepub.com/ on SAGE Journals Online: http://online.sagepub.com/

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Rank-order tournaments, probability of winning and investing in talent: evidence from Champions’ League qualifying rules

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Rank-order tournaments, probability of winning and investing in talent: evidence from Champions’ League qualifying rules. / Green, Colin; Lozano, Fernando; Simmons, Robert.
In: National Institute Economic Review, Vol. 232, No. 1, 05.2015, p. R30-R40.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

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Green C, Lozano F, Simmons R. Rank-order tournaments, probability of winning and investing in talent: evidence from Champions’ League qualifying rules. National Institute Economic Review. 2015 May;232(1):R30-R40. doi: 10.1177/002795011523200104

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Bibtex

@article{09306e72920f419685c8baf20870ce1a,
title = "Rank-order tournaments, probability of winning and investing in talent: evidence from Champions{\textquoteright} League qualifying rules",
abstract = "We analyse how a change in the probability of winning a tournament affects an agent's effort using the qualification rules for entry into the group and playoff stages of the UEFA Champions' League. Our results suggest that increasing the number of slots that a national league gets in the Champions' League leads to increases in investment in talent ex ante. This effect is largest among the teams that in the previous season just failed to qualify. This suggests that changes in prize structure leads to changes in investment decisions amongst those clubs most affected at the margin. However, we also find that incumbent teams that have already qualified for the Champions' League simultaneously raise their efforts, consistent with the occurrence of an arms race among top European football teams.",
keywords = "Champions' League, tournaments, effort, payroll",
author = "Colin Green and Fernando Lozano and Robert Simmons",
note = "The final, definitive version of this article has been published in the Journal, National Institute Economic Review, 232 (1), 2015, {\textcopyright} SAGE Publications Ltd, 2015 by SAGE Publications Ltd at the National Institute Economic Review page: http://ner.sagepub.com/ on SAGE Journals Online: http://online.sagepub.com/ ",
year = "2015",
month = may,
doi = "10.1177/002795011523200104",
language = "English",
volume = "232",
pages = "R30--R40",
journal = "National Institute Economic Review",
issn = "0027-9501",
publisher = "SAGE Publications Ltd",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Rank-order tournaments, probability of winning and investing in talent

T2 - evidence from Champions’ League qualifying rules

AU - Green, Colin

AU - Lozano, Fernando

AU - Simmons, Robert

N1 - The final, definitive version of this article has been published in the Journal, National Institute Economic Review, 232 (1), 2015, © SAGE Publications Ltd, 2015 by SAGE Publications Ltd at the National Institute Economic Review page: http://ner.sagepub.com/ on SAGE Journals Online: http://online.sagepub.com/

PY - 2015/5

Y1 - 2015/5

N2 - We analyse how a change in the probability of winning a tournament affects an agent's effort using the qualification rules for entry into the group and playoff stages of the UEFA Champions' League. Our results suggest that increasing the number of slots that a national league gets in the Champions' League leads to increases in investment in talent ex ante. This effect is largest among the teams that in the previous season just failed to qualify. This suggests that changes in prize structure leads to changes in investment decisions amongst those clubs most affected at the margin. However, we also find that incumbent teams that have already qualified for the Champions' League simultaneously raise their efforts, consistent with the occurrence of an arms race among top European football teams.

AB - We analyse how a change in the probability of winning a tournament affects an agent's effort using the qualification rules for entry into the group and playoff stages of the UEFA Champions' League. Our results suggest that increasing the number of slots that a national league gets in the Champions' League leads to increases in investment in talent ex ante. This effect is largest among the teams that in the previous season just failed to qualify. This suggests that changes in prize structure leads to changes in investment decisions amongst those clubs most affected at the margin. However, we also find that incumbent teams that have already qualified for the Champions' League simultaneously raise their efforts, consistent with the occurrence of an arms race among top European football teams.

KW - Champions' League

KW - tournaments

KW - effort

KW - payroll

U2 - 10.1177/002795011523200104

DO - 10.1177/002795011523200104

M3 - Journal article

VL - 232

SP - R30-R40

JO - National Institute Economic Review

JF - National Institute Economic Review

SN - 0027-9501

IS - 1

ER -