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Responsibility as a Virtue.

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Responsibility as a Virtue. / Williams, Garrath.
In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 11, No. 4, 08.2008, p. 455-470.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Williams, G 2008, 'Responsibility as a Virtue.', Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, vol. 11, no. 4, pp. 455-470. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-008-9109-7

APA

Williams, G. (2008). Responsibility as a Virtue. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 11(4), 455-470. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-008-9109-7

Vancouver

Williams G. Responsibility as a Virtue. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 2008 Aug;11(4):455-470. doi: 10.1007/s10677-008-9109-7

Author

Williams, Garrath. / Responsibility as a Virtue. In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 2008 ; Vol. 11, No. 4. pp. 455-470.

Bibtex

@article{bd48ece207824fc3a6846453fd55b611,
title = "Responsibility as a Virtue.",
abstract = "Philosophers usually discuss responsibility in terms of responsibility for past actions or as a question about the nature of moral agency. Yet the word responsibility is fairly modern, whereas these topics arguably represent timeless concerns about human agency. This paper investigates another use of responsibility, that is particularly important to modern liberal societies: responsibility as a virtue that can be demonstrated by individuals and organisations. The paper notes its initial importance in political contexts, and seeks to explain why we now demand responsibility in all spheres of life. In reply, I highlight the distinctively institutional character of modern liberal societies: institutions specify many of the particular responsibilities each of us must fulfil, but also require responsibility to sustain them and address their failings. My overall argument is that the virtue of responsibility occupies a distinctive place in the moral needs, and moral achievements, of liberal societies; and this, in turn, explains why it now occupies such a prominent place in our moral discourse.",
keywords = "Responsibility, virtue, agency, institutions, liberalism, accountability",
author = "Garrath Williams",
note = "The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com",
year = "2008",
month = aug,
doi = "10.1007/s10677-008-9109-7",
language = "English",
volume = "11",
pages = "455--470",
journal = "Ethical Theory and Moral Practice",
issn = "1386-2820",
publisher = "Springer Netherlands",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Responsibility as a Virtue.

AU - Williams, Garrath

N1 - The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com

PY - 2008/8

Y1 - 2008/8

N2 - Philosophers usually discuss responsibility in terms of responsibility for past actions or as a question about the nature of moral agency. Yet the word responsibility is fairly modern, whereas these topics arguably represent timeless concerns about human agency. This paper investigates another use of responsibility, that is particularly important to modern liberal societies: responsibility as a virtue that can be demonstrated by individuals and organisations. The paper notes its initial importance in political contexts, and seeks to explain why we now demand responsibility in all spheres of life. In reply, I highlight the distinctively institutional character of modern liberal societies: institutions specify many of the particular responsibilities each of us must fulfil, but also require responsibility to sustain them and address their failings. My overall argument is that the virtue of responsibility occupies a distinctive place in the moral needs, and moral achievements, of liberal societies; and this, in turn, explains why it now occupies such a prominent place in our moral discourse.

AB - Philosophers usually discuss responsibility in terms of responsibility for past actions or as a question about the nature of moral agency. Yet the word responsibility is fairly modern, whereas these topics arguably represent timeless concerns about human agency. This paper investigates another use of responsibility, that is particularly important to modern liberal societies: responsibility as a virtue that can be demonstrated by individuals and organisations. The paper notes its initial importance in political contexts, and seeks to explain why we now demand responsibility in all spheres of life. In reply, I highlight the distinctively institutional character of modern liberal societies: institutions specify many of the particular responsibilities each of us must fulfil, but also require responsibility to sustain them and address their failings. My overall argument is that the virtue of responsibility occupies a distinctive place in the moral needs, and moral achievements, of liberal societies; and this, in turn, explains why it now occupies such a prominent place in our moral discourse.

KW - Responsibility

KW - virtue

KW - agency

KW - institutions

KW - liberalism

KW - accountability

U2 - 10.1007/s10677-008-9109-7

DO - 10.1007/s10677-008-9109-7

M3 - Journal article

VL - 11

SP - 455

EP - 470

JO - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

JF - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

SN - 1386-2820

IS - 4

ER -