TY - CHAP

T1 - Rights, responsibilities and regulation of international business

AU - Picciotto, Sol

N1 - Funding Information: We thank P. Eaton, B. Anderson, and K. Cook for many insightful discussions on the topic, and D. Hale for helpful insight, advice, and his inspiring work with the atomic mesh. We also thank D. Eberly for his correspondence regarding mesh differential geometry. We thank R. Krahenbuhl and J. Sun for helpful discussions. We want to thank our reviewers C. Yao, L. Guo, and one anonymous reviewer for their comments and suggestions. We also express thanks to the associate editor, R. Lane, for extensive help with clarity, content, and detail. We want to thank the Ontario Geological Survey and Natural Resources Canada for making the McFaulds Lake data publicly available. This research was supported in part by Newmont Mining Corporation. Partial funding support was also provided by the industry consortium “Gravity and Magnetics Research Consortium” at the Colorado School of Mines. The sponsoring companies at the time were Anadarko, Bell Geospace, BG-Group, BGP International, BP, CGG, ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil, Lockheed Martin, Marathon Oil, Micro-g LaCoste, Petrobras, Shell, and Vale. Publisher Copyright: © 2005 Fiona Beveridge. Copyright: Copyright 2020 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

PY - 2017/1/1

Y1 - 2017/1/1

N2 - This essay discusses the paradox of the emergence of corporate codes of conduct in the 1990s, following pressures from consumer and labor activism, in a period of more general liberalization of international investment leading to deregulation. It suggests that the advantages of flexibility and adaptability to specific circumstances offered by such codes are counterbalanced by their self-selected content and inadequate enforcement. Rejecting the assumption that there is a sharp distinction between voluntary standards and binding law, the essay analyzes various ways of grounding codes in legal obligations. It proposes that a safer and more dependable environment for international investment could be provided by a framework agreement, which would link binding standards for corporate social responsibility in key areas, such as combating bribery and cooperation in tax enforcement, with traditional investor rights based on investor protection and liberalization rules.

AB - This essay discusses the paradox of the emergence of corporate codes of conduct in the 1990s, following pressures from consumer and labor activism, in a period of more general liberalization of international investment leading to deregulation. It suggests that the advantages of flexibility and adaptability to specific circumstances offered by such codes are counterbalanced by their self-selected content and inadequate enforcement. Rejecting the assumption that there is a sharp distinction between voluntary standards and binding law, the essay analyzes various ways of grounding codes in legal obligations. It proposes that a safer and more dependable environment for international investment could be provided by a framework agreement, which would link binding standards for corporate social responsibility in key areas, such as combating bribery and cooperation in tax enforcement, with traditional investor rights based on investor protection and liberalization rules.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85021958888&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.4324/9781315254104-7

DO - 10.4324/9781315254104-7

M3 - Chapter

AN - SCOPUS:85021958888

SN - 0754624153

SN - 9780754624158

SP - 117

EP - 198

BT - Globalization and International Investment

PB - Taylor and Francis

ER -