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Rituals of Reason: A Choice-Based Approach to the Acceptability of Lotteries in Allocation Problems

Research output: Working paper

Published

Standard

Rituals of Reason : A Choice-Based Approach to the Acceptability of Lotteries in Allocation Problems. / Bouacida, Elias; Foucart, Renaud.

Lancaster : Lancaster University, Department of Economics, 2022. (Economics Working Papers Series; Vol. 2022/005).

Research output: Working paper

Harvard

Bouacida, E & Foucart, R 2022 'Rituals of Reason: A Choice-Based Approach to the Acceptability of Lotteries in Allocation Problems' Economics Working Papers Series, vol. 2022/005, Lancaster University, Department of Economics, Lancaster.

APA

Bouacida, E., & Foucart, R. (2022). Rituals of Reason: A Choice-Based Approach to the Acceptability of Lotteries in Allocation Problems. (Economics Working Papers Series; Vol. 2022/005). Lancaster University, Department of Economics.

Vancouver

Bouacida E, Foucart R. Rituals of Reason: A Choice-Based Approach to the Acceptability of Lotteries in Allocation Problems. Lancaster: Lancaster University, Department of Economics. 2022 Mar 23. (Economics Working Papers Series).

Author

Bouacida, Elias ; Foucart, Renaud. / Rituals of Reason : A Choice-Based Approach to the Acceptability of Lotteries in Allocation Problems. Lancaster : Lancaster University, Department of Economics, 2022. (Economics Working Papers Series).

Bibtex

@techreport{39f0b03cad554503a651e82c8aef7d4e,
title = "Rituals of Reason: A Choice-Based Approach to the Acceptability of Lotteries in Allocation Problems",
abstract = "We study revealed preferences towards the use of random procedures in allocation mechanisms. We report the results of an experiment in which subjects vote on a procedure to allocate a reward to half of them. The first possibility is an explicitly random device: the result of a lottery. The second is either an unpredictable procedure they could interpret as meritocratic, or one that is obviously arbitrary. We run all treatments with and without control. We identify an aversion to lotteries and clearly arbitrary procedures across treatments, even though, on aggregate, subjects do not believe any procedure to give them a higher probability of success and there is no correlation between beliefs and outcomes. In line with the literature, we also find evidence of a control premium in most procedures.",
keywords = "lotteries, mechanism design, allocation problems, procedures, tiebreaking rule",
author = "Elias Bouacida and Renaud Foucart",
year = "2022",
month = mar,
day = "23",
language = "English",
series = "Economics Working Papers Series",
publisher = "Lancaster University, Department of Economics",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Lancaster University, Department of Economics",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Rituals of Reason

T2 - A Choice-Based Approach to the Acceptability of Lotteries in Allocation Problems

AU - Bouacida, Elias

AU - Foucart, Renaud

PY - 2022/3/23

Y1 - 2022/3/23

N2 - We study revealed preferences towards the use of random procedures in allocation mechanisms. We report the results of an experiment in which subjects vote on a procedure to allocate a reward to half of them. The first possibility is an explicitly random device: the result of a lottery. The second is either an unpredictable procedure they could interpret as meritocratic, or one that is obviously arbitrary. We run all treatments with and without control. We identify an aversion to lotteries and clearly arbitrary procedures across treatments, even though, on aggregate, subjects do not believe any procedure to give them a higher probability of success and there is no correlation between beliefs and outcomes. In line with the literature, we also find evidence of a control premium in most procedures.

AB - We study revealed preferences towards the use of random procedures in allocation mechanisms. We report the results of an experiment in which subjects vote on a procedure to allocate a reward to half of them. The first possibility is an explicitly random device: the result of a lottery. The second is either an unpredictable procedure they could interpret as meritocratic, or one that is obviously arbitrary. We run all treatments with and without control. We identify an aversion to lotteries and clearly arbitrary procedures across treatments, even though, on aggregate, subjects do not believe any procedure to give them a higher probability of success and there is no correlation between beliefs and outcomes. In line with the literature, we also find evidence of a control premium in most procedures.

KW - lotteries

KW - mechanism design

KW - allocation problems

KW - procedures

KW - tiebreaking rule

M3 - Working paper

T3 - Economics Working Papers Series

BT - Rituals of Reason

PB - Lancaster University, Department of Economics

CY - Lancaster

ER -