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Rituals of Reason: Experimental Evidence on the Social Acceptability of Lotteries in Allocation Problems

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

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Rituals of Reason: Experimental Evidence on the Social Acceptability of Lotteries in Allocation Problems. / Foucart, Renaud.
In: Games and Economic Behavior, 05.04.2025.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Foucart, R 2025, 'Rituals of Reason: Experimental Evidence on the Social Acceptability of Lotteries in Allocation Problems', Games and Economic Behavior. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.001

APA

Foucart, R. (in press). Rituals of Reason: Experimental Evidence on the Social Acceptability of Lotteries in Allocation Problems. Games and Economic Behavior. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.001

Vancouver

Foucart R. Rituals of Reason: Experimental Evidence on the Social Acceptability of Lotteries in Allocation Problems. Games and Economic Behavior. 2025 Apr 5. doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.001

Author

Foucart, Renaud. / Rituals of Reason : Experimental Evidence on the Social Acceptability of Lotteries in Allocation Problems. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 2025.

Bibtex

@article{9bd11a6a5ea44fb4864941c2f572092a,
title = "Rituals of Reason: Experimental Evidence on the Social Acceptability of Lotteries in Allocation Problems",
abstract = "We study collective preferences towards the use of random procedures in allocation mechanisms. We report the results of two experiments in which subjects choose a procedure to allocate a reward to half of them. The first possibility is an explicitly random device: the outcome of a lottery. The second is an equally unpredictable procedure with an identical success rate, but without explicit randomization. We identify an aversion to lotteries, particularly when compared to procedures reminiscent of meritocratic ones. In line with the literature, we also find evidence of a preference for control in most procedures.",
author = "Renaud Foucart",
year = "2025",
month = apr,
day = "5",
doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.001",
language = "English",
journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",
issn = "0899-8256",
publisher = "ELSEVIER ACADEMIC PRESS INC",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Rituals of Reason

T2 - Experimental Evidence on the Social Acceptability of Lotteries in Allocation Problems

AU - Foucart, Renaud

PY - 2025/4/5

Y1 - 2025/4/5

N2 - We study collective preferences towards the use of random procedures in allocation mechanisms. We report the results of two experiments in which subjects choose a procedure to allocate a reward to half of them. The first possibility is an explicitly random device: the outcome of a lottery. The second is an equally unpredictable procedure with an identical success rate, but without explicit randomization. We identify an aversion to lotteries, particularly when compared to procedures reminiscent of meritocratic ones. In line with the literature, we also find evidence of a preference for control in most procedures.

AB - We study collective preferences towards the use of random procedures in allocation mechanisms. We report the results of two experiments in which subjects choose a procedure to allocate a reward to half of them. The first possibility is an explicitly random device: the outcome of a lottery. The second is an equally unpredictable procedure with an identical success rate, but without explicit randomization. We identify an aversion to lotteries, particularly when compared to procedures reminiscent of meritocratic ones. In line with the literature, we also find evidence of a preference for control in most procedures.

U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.001

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.001

M3 - Journal article

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

SN - 0899-8256

ER -