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Rule rationality

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Rule rationality. / Heller, Y.; Winter, E.
In: International Economic Review, Vol. 57, No. 3, 08.2016, p. 997-1026.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Heller, Y & Winter, E 2016, 'Rule rationality', International Economic Review, vol. 57, no. 3, pp. 997-1026. https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12183

APA

Heller, Y., & Winter, E. (2016). Rule rationality. International Economic Review, 57(3), 997-1026. https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12183

Vancouver

Heller Y, Winter E. Rule rationality. International Economic Review. 2016 Aug;57(3):997-1026. doi: 10.1111/iere.12183

Author

Heller, Y. ; Winter, E. / Rule rationality. In: International Economic Review. 2016 ; Vol. 57, No. 3. pp. 997-1026.

Bibtex

@article{097e8b2c9b9a44cd8c693471bb7eac60,
title = "Rule rationality",
abstract = "We study the strategic advantages of following rules of thumb that bundle different games together (called rule rationality) when this may be observed by one's opponent. We present a model in which the strategic environment determines which kind of rule rationality is adopted by the players. We apply the model to characterize the induced rules and outcomes in various interesting environments. Finally, we show the close relations between act rationality and “Stackelberg stability” (no player can earn from playing first). {\textcopyright} (2016) by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association",
author = "Y. Heller and E. Winter",
year = "2016",
month = aug,
doi = "10.1111/iere.12183",
language = "English",
volume = "57",
pages = "997--1026",
journal = "International Economic Review",
issn = "0020-6598",
publisher = "WILEY-BLACKWELL PUBLISHING, INC",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Rule rationality

AU - Heller, Y.

AU - Winter, E.

PY - 2016/8

Y1 - 2016/8

N2 - We study the strategic advantages of following rules of thumb that bundle different games together (called rule rationality) when this may be observed by one's opponent. We present a model in which the strategic environment determines which kind of rule rationality is adopted by the players. We apply the model to characterize the induced rules and outcomes in various interesting environments. Finally, we show the close relations between act rationality and “Stackelberg stability” (no player can earn from playing first). © (2016) by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association

AB - We study the strategic advantages of following rules of thumb that bundle different games together (called rule rationality) when this may be observed by one's opponent. We present a model in which the strategic environment determines which kind of rule rationality is adopted by the players. We apply the model to characterize the induced rules and outcomes in various interesting environments. Finally, we show the close relations between act rationality and “Stackelberg stability” (no player can earn from playing first). © (2016) by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association

U2 - 10.1111/iere.12183

DO - 10.1111/iere.12183

M3 - Journal article

VL - 57

SP - 997

EP - 1026

JO - International Economic Review

JF - International Economic Review

SN - 0020-6598

IS - 3

ER -