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Sad-Loser contests

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Sad-Loser contests. / Matros, Alexander.
In: Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 48, No. 3, 05.2012, p. 155-162.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Matros, A 2012, 'Sad-Loser contests', Journal of Mathematical Economics, vol. 48, no. 3, pp. 155-162. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2012.03.001

APA

Matros, A. (2012). Sad-Loser contests. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 48(3), 155-162. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2012.03.001

Vancouver

Matros A. Sad-Loser contests. Journal of Mathematical Economics. 2012 May;48(3):155-162. doi: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2012.03.001

Author

Matros, Alexander. / Sad-Loser contests. In: Journal of Mathematical Economics. 2012 ; Vol. 48, No. 3. pp. 155-162.

Bibtex

@article{fa2f5f9bea864a49a20042e16def3143,
title = "Sad-Loser contests",
abstract = "We consider asymmetric winner-reimbursed contests. It turns out that such contests (Sad-Loser) have multiple internal pure-strategy equilibria (where at least two players are active). We describe all equilibria and discuss their properties. In particular, we find (1) that an active player is indifferent among all her non-negative choices and her expected payoff is zero in any internal equilibrium, (2) that a higher-value (stronger) player always spends less than a lower-value (weaker) player and therefore always has a lower chance to win a Sad-Loser contest in any internal equilibrium, and (3) a sufficient condition for a net total spending to be higher in a Sad-Loser contest than in the corresponding asymmetric contest. ",
keywords = "Lottery, Contest, Winner{\textquoteright}s reward",
author = "Alexander Matros",
year = "2012",
month = may,
doi = "10.1016/j.jmateco.2012.03.001",
language = "English",
volume = "48",
pages = "155--162",
journal = "Journal of Mathematical Economics",
issn = "0304-4068",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Sad-Loser contests

AU - Matros, Alexander

PY - 2012/5

Y1 - 2012/5

N2 - We consider asymmetric winner-reimbursed contests. It turns out that such contests (Sad-Loser) have multiple internal pure-strategy equilibria (where at least two players are active). We describe all equilibria and discuss their properties. In particular, we find (1) that an active player is indifferent among all her non-negative choices and her expected payoff is zero in any internal equilibrium, (2) that a higher-value (stronger) player always spends less than a lower-value (weaker) player and therefore always has a lower chance to win a Sad-Loser contest in any internal equilibrium, and (3) a sufficient condition for a net total spending to be higher in a Sad-Loser contest than in the corresponding asymmetric contest.

AB - We consider asymmetric winner-reimbursed contests. It turns out that such contests (Sad-Loser) have multiple internal pure-strategy equilibria (where at least two players are active). We describe all equilibria and discuss their properties. In particular, we find (1) that an active player is indifferent among all her non-negative choices and her expected payoff is zero in any internal equilibrium, (2) that a higher-value (stronger) player always spends less than a lower-value (weaker) player and therefore always has a lower chance to win a Sad-Loser contest in any internal equilibrium, and (3) a sufficient condition for a net total spending to be higher in a Sad-Loser contest than in the corresponding asymmetric contest.

KW - Lottery

KW - Contest

KW - Winner’s reward

U2 - 10.1016/j.jmateco.2012.03.001

DO - 10.1016/j.jmateco.2012.03.001

M3 - Journal article

VL - 48

SP - 155

EP - 162

JO - Journal of Mathematical Economics

JF - Journal of Mathematical Economics

SN - 0304-4068

IS - 3

ER -