Scale economies, consistent conjectures and teams

Economics

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Scale economies, consistent conjectures and teams. / Mcginty, Matthew; Heywood, John.
In: Economics Letters, Vol. 117, No. 3, 12.2012, p. 566-568.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Mcginty, M & Heywood, J 2012, 'Scale economies, consistent conjectures and teams', Economics Letters, vol. 117, no. 3, pp. 566-568. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.07.027

APA

Mcginty, M., & Heywood, J. (2012). Scale economies, consistent conjectures and teams. Economics Letters, 117(3), 566-568. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.07.027

Vancouver

Mcginty M, Heywood J. Scale economies, consistent conjectures and teams. Economics Letters. 2012 Dec;117(3):566-568. doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.07.027

Author

Mcginty, Matthew ; Heywood, John. / Scale economies, consistent conjectures and teams. In: Economics Letters. 2012 ; Vol. 117, No. 3. pp. 566-568.

Bibtex

@article{19a4a115dbb3482fa3209c4e851908fd,

title = "Scale economies, consistent conjectures and teams",

abstract = "This paper models the behavior of team members in a consistent conjectures equilibrium. When subject to scale economies, team members produce more than Nash and when subject to scale diseconomies, they produce less than Nash. Moreover, even when effort levels of team members are perfect substitutes in production, they can be strategic complements in the face of scale economies. Finally, with sufficient scale economies, the complementarity eliminates free-riding and the team optimum is obtained.",

keywords = "Team production, Scale economies , Consistent conjectures",

author = "Matthew Mcginty and John Heywood",

year = "2012",

month = dec,

doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2012.07.027",

language = "English",

volume = "117",

pages = "566--568",

journal = "Economics Letters",

issn = "0165-1765",

publisher = "Elsevier",

number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Scale economies, consistent conjectures and teams

AU - Mcginty, Matthew

AU - Heywood, John

PY - 2012/12

Y1 - 2012/12

N2 - This paper models the behavior of team members in a consistent conjectures equilibrium. When subject to scale economies, team members produce more than Nash and when subject to scale diseconomies, they produce less than Nash. Moreover, even when effort levels of team members are perfect substitutes in production, they can be strategic complements in the face of scale economies. Finally, with sufficient scale economies, the complementarity eliminates free-riding and the team optimum is obtained.

AB - This paper models the behavior of team members in a consistent conjectures equilibrium. When subject to scale economies, team members produce more than Nash and when subject to scale diseconomies, they produce less than Nash. Moreover, even when effort levels of team members are perfect substitutes in production, they can be strategic complements in the face of scale economies. Finally, with sufficient scale economies, the complementarity eliminates free-riding and the team optimum is obtained.

KW - Team production

KW - Scale economies

KW - Consistent conjectures

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.07.027

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.07.027

M3 - Journal article

VL - 117

SP - 566

EP - 568

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

SN - 0165-1765

IS - 3

ER -

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