Final published version
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Search without looking
AU - Matros, A.
AU - Ponomareva, N.
AU - Smirnov, V.
AU - Wait, A.
PY - 2022/6/30
Y1 - 2022/6/30
N2 - We analyze a dynamic game in which agents strategically search for a prize/reward of known value when they cannot observe the search of others. In every period the rivals decide how much to search. The prize goes to the player who finds it first unless there is simultaneous discovery, in which case the reward is destroyed. In the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium all players receive an expected payoff of zero. A third party could however increase welfare and avoid some search duplication by allocating search zones, even if these exclusive search zones are non-binding.
AB - We analyze a dynamic game in which agents strategically search for a prize/reward of known value when they cannot observe the search of others. In every period the rivals decide how much to search. The prize goes to the player who finds it first unless there is simultaneous discovery, in which case the reward is destroyed. In the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium all players receive an expected payoff of zero. A third party could however increase welfare and avoid some search duplication by allocating search zones, even if these exclusive search zones are non-binding.
KW - Search
KW - Unobservability
KW - Duplication
KW - Regulatory design
U2 - 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104441
DO - 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104441
M3 - Journal article
VL - 139
JO - Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
JF - Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
SN - 0165-1889
M1 - 104441
ER -