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Securing cyber-physical social interactions on wrist-worn devices

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Securing cyber-physical social interactions on wrist-worn devices. / Shen, Yiran; Du, Bowen; Xu, Weitao et al.
In: ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks (TOSN), Vol. 16, No. 2, 31.05.2020, p. 1-22.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Shen, Y, Du, B, Xu, W, Luo, C, Wei, B, Cui, L & Wen, H 2020, 'Securing cyber-physical social interactions on wrist-worn devices', ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks (TOSN), vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 1-22. https://doi.org/10.1145/3378669

APA

Shen, Y., Du, B., Xu, W., Luo, C., Wei, B., Cui, L., & Wen, H. (2020). Securing cyber-physical social interactions on wrist-worn devices. ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks (TOSN), 16(2), 1-22. https://doi.org/10.1145/3378669

Vancouver

Shen Y, Du B, Xu W, Luo C, Wei B, Cui L et al. Securing cyber-physical social interactions on wrist-worn devices. ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks (TOSN). 2020 May 31;16(2):1-22. Epub 2020 Apr 9. doi: 10.1145/3378669

Author

Shen, Yiran ; Du, Bowen ; Xu, Weitao et al. / Securing cyber-physical social interactions on wrist-worn devices. In: ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks (TOSN). 2020 ; Vol. 16, No. 2. pp. 1-22.

Bibtex

@article{46fc86351888488b976423aeb0a8b7cc,
title = "Securing cyber-physical social interactions on wrist-worn devices",
abstract = "Since ancient Greece, handshaking has been commonly practiced between two people as a friendly gesture to express trust and respect, or form a mutual agreement. In this article, we show that such physical contact can be used to bootstrap secure cyber contact between the smart devices worn by users. The key observation is that during handshaking, although belonged to two different users, the two hands involved in the shaking events are often rigidly connected, and therefore exhibit very similar motion patterns. We propose a novel key generation system, which harvests motion data during user handshaking from the wrist-worn smart devices such as smartwatches or fitness bands, and exploits the matching motion patterns to generate symmetric keys on both parties. The generated keys can be then used to establish a secure communication channel for exchanging data between devices. This provides a much more natural and user-friendly alternative for many applications, e.g., exchanging/sharing contact details, friending on social networks, or even making payments, since it doesn{\textquoteright}t involve extra bespoke hardware, nor require the users to perform pre-defined gestures. We implement the proposed key generation system on off-the-shelf smartwatches, and extensive evaluation shows that it can reliably generate 128-bit symmetric keys just after around 1s of handshaking (with success rate >99%), and is resilient to different types of attacks including impersonate mimicking attacks, impersonate passive attacks, or eavesdropping attacks. Specifically, for real-time impersonate mimicking attacks, in our experiments, the Equal Error Rate (EER) is only 1.6% on average. We also show that the proposed key generation system can be extremely lightweight and is able to run in-situ on the resource-constrained smartwatches without incurring excessive resource consumption.",
keywords = "Symmetric keys generation, device pairing, IMU sensors, principal component analysis",
author = "Yiran Shen and Bowen Du and Weitao Xu and Chengwen Luo and Bo Wei and Lizhen Cui and Hongkai Wen",
year = "2020",
month = may,
day = "31",
doi = "10.1145/3378669",
language = "English",
volume = "16",
pages = "1--22",
journal = "ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks (TOSN)",
issn = "1550-4867",
publisher = "Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Securing cyber-physical social interactions on wrist-worn devices

AU - Shen, Yiran

AU - Du, Bowen

AU - Xu, Weitao

AU - Luo, Chengwen

AU - Wei, Bo

AU - Cui, Lizhen

AU - Wen, Hongkai

PY - 2020/5/31

Y1 - 2020/5/31

N2 - Since ancient Greece, handshaking has been commonly practiced between two people as a friendly gesture to express trust and respect, or form a mutual agreement. In this article, we show that such physical contact can be used to bootstrap secure cyber contact between the smart devices worn by users. The key observation is that during handshaking, although belonged to two different users, the two hands involved in the shaking events are often rigidly connected, and therefore exhibit very similar motion patterns. We propose a novel key generation system, which harvests motion data during user handshaking from the wrist-worn smart devices such as smartwatches or fitness bands, and exploits the matching motion patterns to generate symmetric keys on both parties. The generated keys can be then used to establish a secure communication channel for exchanging data between devices. This provides a much more natural and user-friendly alternative for many applications, e.g., exchanging/sharing contact details, friending on social networks, or even making payments, since it doesn’t involve extra bespoke hardware, nor require the users to perform pre-defined gestures. We implement the proposed key generation system on off-the-shelf smartwatches, and extensive evaluation shows that it can reliably generate 128-bit symmetric keys just after around 1s of handshaking (with success rate >99%), and is resilient to different types of attacks including impersonate mimicking attacks, impersonate passive attacks, or eavesdropping attacks. Specifically, for real-time impersonate mimicking attacks, in our experiments, the Equal Error Rate (EER) is only 1.6% on average. We also show that the proposed key generation system can be extremely lightweight and is able to run in-situ on the resource-constrained smartwatches without incurring excessive resource consumption.

AB - Since ancient Greece, handshaking has been commonly practiced between two people as a friendly gesture to express trust and respect, or form a mutual agreement. In this article, we show that such physical contact can be used to bootstrap secure cyber contact between the smart devices worn by users. The key observation is that during handshaking, although belonged to two different users, the two hands involved in the shaking events are often rigidly connected, and therefore exhibit very similar motion patterns. We propose a novel key generation system, which harvests motion data during user handshaking from the wrist-worn smart devices such as smartwatches or fitness bands, and exploits the matching motion patterns to generate symmetric keys on both parties. The generated keys can be then used to establish a secure communication channel for exchanging data between devices. This provides a much more natural and user-friendly alternative for many applications, e.g., exchanging/sharing contact details, friending on social networks, or even making payments, since it doesn’t involve extra bespoke hardware, nor require the users to perform pre-defined gestures. We implement the proposed key generation system on off-the-shelf smartwatches, and extensive evaluation shows that it can reliably generate 128-bit symmetric keys just after around 1s of handshaking (with success rate >99%), and is resilient to different types of attacks including impersonate mimicking attacks, impersonate passive attacks, or eavesdropping attacks. Specifically, for real-time impersonate mimicking attacks, in our experiments, the Equal Error Rate (EER) is only 1.6% on average. We also show that the proposed key generation system can be extremely lightweight and is able to run in-situ on the resource-constrained smartwatches without incurring excessive resource consumption.

KW - Symmetric keys generation

KW - device pairing

KW - IMU sensors

KW - principal component analysis

U2 - 10.1145/3378669

DO - 10.1145/3378669

M3 - Journal article

VL - 16

SP - 1

EP - 22

JO - ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks (TOSN)

JF - ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks (TOSN)

SN - 1550-4867

IS - 2

ER -