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    Rights statement: This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 90 2018 DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2018.03.004

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Shipwrecks and treasure hunters

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articlepeer-review

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Shipwrecks and treasure hunters. / Roos, Nicolas de; Matros, Alexander; Smirnov, Vladimir; Wait, Andrew.

In: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Vol. 90, 05.2018, p. 259-283.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Roos, ND, Matros, A, Smirnov, V & Wait, A 2018, 'Shipwrecks and treasure hunters', Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, vol. 90, pp. 259-283. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2018.03.004

APA

Roos, N. D., Matros, A., Smirnov, V., & Wait, A. (2018). Shipwrecks and treasure hunters. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 90, 259-283. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2018.03.004

Vancouver

Roos ND, Matros A, Smirnov V, Wait A. Shipwrecks and treasure hunters. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control. 2018 May;90:259-283. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2018.03.004

Author

Roos, Nicolas de ; Matros, Alexander ; Smirnov, Vladimir ; Wait, Andrew. / Shipwrecks and treasure hunters. In: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control. 2018 ; Vol. 90. pp. 259-283.

Bibtex

@article{7e087feaaaad4448a3a53a333f624ac5,
title = "Shipwrecks and treasure hunters",
abstract = "We examine dynamic search as a game in which two rivals explore (an island) for a hidden prize of known value. In every period until its discovery, the players decide how much of the unsearched area to comb. If a player finds the prize alone he wins it and the game ends. Players have a per-period discount factor and costs proportional to the area they search. First, as a benchmark for efficiency, we solve the one-player search problem. Second, in the two-player setting we show that typically there is inefficient over-search – a result akin to the tragedy of the commons. However, for players with intermediate levels of patience, there is the possibility of inefficient under-search as players incorporate the expected future payoffs in their current search decisions. Finally, with patient players, several counterintuitive results can arise: for example, players might be better off searching a larger island or looking for a less valuable prize.",
keywords = "R&D, Search, Uncertainty",
author = "Roos, {Nicolas de} and Alexander Matros and Vladimir Smirnov and Andrew Wait",
note = "This is the author{\textquoteright}s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 90 2018 DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2018.03.004",
year = "2018",
month = may,
doi = "10.1016/j.jedc.2018.03.004",
language = "English",
volume = "90",
pages = "259--283",
journal = "Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control",
issn = "0165-1889",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Shipwrecks and treasure hunters

AU - Roos, Nicolas de

AU - Matros, Alexander

AU - Smirnov, Vladimir

AU - Wait, Andrew

N1 - This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 90 2018 DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2018.03.004

PY - 2018/5

Y1 - 2018/5

N2 - We examine dynamic search as a game in which two rivals explore (an island) for a hidden prize of known value. In every period until its discovery, the players decide how much of the unsearched area to comb. If a player finds the prize alone he wins it and the game ends. Players have a per-period discount factor and costs proportional to the area they search. First, as a benchmark for efficiency, we solve the one-player search problem. Second, in the two-player setting we show that typically there is inefficient over-search – a result akin to the tragedy of the commons. However, for players with intermediate levels of patience, there is the possibility of inefficient under-search as players incorporate the expected future payoffs in their current search decisions. Finally, with patient players, several counterintuitive results can arise: for example, players might be better off searching a larger island or looking for a less valuable prize.

AB - We examine dynamic search as a game in which two rivals explore (an island) for a hidden prize of known value. In every period until its discovery, the players decide how much of the unsearched area to comb. If a player finds the prize alone he wins it and the game ends. Players have a per-period discount factor and costs proportional to the area they search. First, as a benchmark for efficiency, we solve the one-player search problem. Second, in the two-player setting we show that typically there is inefficient over-search – a result akin to the tragedy of the commons. However, for players with intermediate levels of patience, there is the possibility of inefficient under-search as players incorporate the expected future payoffs in their current search decisions. Finally, with patient players, several counterintuitive results can arise: for example, players might be better off searching a larger island or looking for a less valuable prize.

KW - R&D

KW - Search

KW - Uncertainty

U2 - 10.1016/j.jedc.2018.03.004

DO - 10.1016/j.jedc.2018.03.004

M3 - Journal article

VL - 90

SP - 259

EP - 283

JO - Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control

JF - Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control

SN - 0165-1889

ER -