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Simple subscription mechanisms for excludable public goods

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

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Simple subscription mechanisms for excludable public goods. / Bag, P.K.; Winter, E.
In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 87, No. 1, 07.1999, p. 72-94.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Bag, PK & Winter, E 1999, 'Simple subscription mechanisms for excludable public goods', Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 87, no. 1, pp. 72-94. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2497

APA

Bag, P. K., & Winter, E. (1999). Simple subscription mechanisms for excludable public goods. Journal of Economic Theory, 87(1), 72-94. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2497

Vancouver

Bag PK, Winter E. Simple subscription mechanisms for excludable public goods. Journal of Economic Theory. 1999 Jul;87(1):72-94. doi: 10.1006/jeth.1998.2497

Author

Bag, P.K. ; Winter, E. / Simple subscription mechanisms for excludable public goods. In: Journal of Economic Theory. 1999 ; Vol. 87, No. 1. pp. 72-94.

Bibtex

@article{877c414e95a84bcfa947ebdda6ab13c8,
title = "Simple subscription mechanisms for excludable public goods",
abstract = "For excludable public goods, we propose simple mechanisms to uniquely implement a (core) stable and efficient production and cost-sharing outcome: consumers are asked to announce sequentially their minimal requested level of public good and a subscription towards its production. In one mechanism the subscriptions depend on the order of moves. In a second mechanism, the subscriptions are order-independent and thus symmetric. The equilibrium outcomes induced by our mechanisms are immune to strategic deviations by coalitions. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: H41, C72, D78. {\textcopyright} 1999 Academic Press.",
author = "P.K. Bag and E. Winter",
year = "1999",
month = jul,
doi = "10.1006/jeth.1998.2497",
language = "English",
volume = "87",
pages = "72--94",
journal = "Journal of Economic Theory",
issn = "0022-0531",
publisher = "ELSEVIER ACADEMIC PRESS INC",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Simple subscription mechanisms for excludable public goods

AU - Bag, P.K.

AU - Winter, E.

PY - 1999/7

Y1 - 1999/7

N2 - For excludable public goods, we propose simple mechanisms to uniquely implement a (core) stable and efficient production and cost-sharing outcome: consumers are asked to announce sequentially their minimal requested level of public good and a subscription towards its production. In one mechanism the subscriptions depend on the order of moves. In a second mechanism, the subscriptions are order-independent and thus symmetric. The equilibrium outcomes induced by our mechanisms are immune to strategic deviations by coalitions. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: H41, C72, D78. © 1999 Academic Press.

AB - For excludable public goods, we propose simple mechanisms to uniquely implement a (core) stable and efficient production and cost-sharing outcome: consumers are asked to announce sequentially their minimal requested level of public good and a subscription towards its production. In one mechanism the subscriptions depend on the order of moves. In a second mechanism, the subscriptions are order-independent and thus symmetric. The equilibrium outcomes induced by our mechanisms are immune to strategic deviations by coalitions. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: H41, C72, D78. © 1999 Academic Press.

U2 - 10.1006/jeth.1998.2497

DO - 10.1006/jeth.1998.2497

M3 - Journal article

VL - 87

SP - 72

EP - 94

JO - Journal of Economic Theory

JF - Journal of Economic Theory

SN - 0022-0531

IS - 1

ER -