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Spectrum value for coalitional games

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Spectrum value for coalitional games. / Álvarez-Mozos, M.; Hellman, Z.; Winter, E.
In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 82, 11.2013, p. 132-142.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Álvarez-Mozos, M, Hellman, Z & Winter, E 2013, 'Spectrum value for coalitional games', Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 82, pp. 132-142. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.06.011

APA

Álvarez-Mozos, M., Hellman, Z., & Winter, E. (2013). Spectrum value for coalitional games. Games and Economic Behavior, 82, 132-142. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.06.011

Vancouver

Álvarez-Mozos M, Hellman Z, Winter E. Spectrum value for coalitional games. Games and Economic Behavior. 2013 Nov;82:132-142. doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.06.011

Author

Álvarez-Mozos, M. ; Hellman, Z. ; Winter, E. / Spectrum value for coalitional games. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 2013 ; Vol. 82. pp. 132-142.

Bibtex

@article{7e85f97179764c0baff86bf51785ebfd,
title = "Spectrum value for coalitional games",
abstract = "Assuming a 'spectrum' or ordering of the players of a coalitional game, as in a political spectrum in a parliamentary situation, we consider a variation of the Shapley value in which coalitions may only be formed if they are connected with respect to the spectrum. This results in a naturally asymmetric power index in which positioning along the spectrum is critical. We present both a characterization of this value by means of properties and combinatoric formulae for calculating it. In simple majority games, the greatest power accrues to 'moderate' players who are located neither at the extremes of the spectrum nor in its center. In supermajority games, power increasingly accrues towards the extremes, and in unanimity games all power is held by the players at the extreme of the spectrum. {\textcopyright} 2013 Elsevier Inc.",
keywords = "Coalitional games, Political spectrum, Restricted cooperation, Shapley value",
author = "M. {\'A}lvarez-Mozos and Z. Hellman and E. Winter",
year = "2013",
month = nov,
doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2013.06.011",
language = "English",
volume = "82",
pages = "132--142",
journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",
issn = "0899-8256",
publisher = "ELSEVIER ACADEMIC PRESS INC",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Spectrum value for coalitional games

AU - Álvarez-Mozos, M.

AU - Hellman, Z.

AU - Winter, E.

PY - 2013/11

Y1 - 2013/11

N2 - Assuming a 'spectrum' or ordering of the players of a coalitional game, as in a political spectrum in a parliamentary situation, we consider a variation of the Shapley value in which coalitions may only be formed if they are connected with respect to the spectrum. This results in a naturally asymmetric power index in which positioning along the spectrum is critical. We present both a characterization of this value by means of properties and combinatoric formulae for calculating it. In simple majority games, the greatest power accrues to 'moderate' players who are located neither at the extremes of the spectrum nor in its center. In supermajority games, power increasingly accrues towards the extremes, and in unanimity games all power is held by the players at the extreme of the spectrum. © 2013 Elsevier Inc.

AB - Assuming a 'spectrum' or ordering of the players of a coalitional game, as in a political spectrum in a parliamentary situation, we consider a variation of the Shapley value in which coalitions may only be formed if they are connected with respect to the spectrum. This results in a naturally asymmetric power index in which positioning along the spectrum is critical. We present both a characterization of this value by means of properties and combinatoric formulae for calculating it. In simple majority games, the greatest power accrues to 'moderate' players who are located neither at the extremes of the spectrum nor in its center. In supermajority games, power increasingly accrues towards the extremes, and in unanimity games all power is held by the players at the extreme of the spectrum. © 2013 Elsevier Inc.

KW - Coalitional games

KW - Political spectrum

KW - Restricted cooperation

KW - Shapley value

U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2013.06.011

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2013.06.011

M3 - Journal article

VL - 82

SP - 132

EP - 142

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

SN - 0899-8256

ER -