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Stability and segregation in group formation

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Stability and segregation in group formation. / Milchtaich, I.; Winter, E.
In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 38, No. 2, 02.2002, p. 318-346.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Milchtaich, I & Winter, E 2002, 'Stability and segregation in group formation', Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 38, no. 2, pp. 318-346. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0878

APA

Milchtaich, I., & Winter, E. (2002). Stability and segregation in group formation. Games and Economic Behavior, 38(2), 318-346. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0878

Vancouver

Milchtaich I, Winter E. Stability and segregation in group formation. Games and Economic Behavior. 2002 Feb;38(2):318-346. doi: 10.1006/game.2001.0878

Author

Milchtaich, I. ; Winter, E. / Stability and segregation in group formation. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 2002 ; Vol. 38, No. 2. pp. 318-346.

Bibtex

@article{18a054c138304773a8bd633f854ff8ba,
title = "Stability and segregation in group formation",
abstract = "This paper presents a model of group formation based on the assumption that individuals prefer to associate with people similar to them. It is shown that, in general, if the number of groups that can be formed is bounded, then a stable partition of the society into groups may not exist. (A partition is defined as stable if none of the individuals would prefer be in a different group than the one he is in.) However, if individuals' characteristics are one-dimensional, then a stable partition always exists. We give sufficient conditions for stable partitions to be segregating (in the sense that, for example, low-characteristic individuals are in one group and high-characteristic ones are in another) and Pareto efficient. In addition, we propose a dynamic model of individual myopic behavior describing the evolution of group formation to an eventual stable, segregating, and Pareto efficient partition. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, H41. {\textcopyright} 2002 Elsevier Science.",
keywords = "Coalition structure, Group formation, Local public goods, Myopic optimization, Segregation, Weak acyclicity",
author = "I. Milchtaich and E. Winter",
year = "2002",
month = feb,
doi = "10.1006/game.2001.0878",
language = "English",
volume = "38",
pages = "318--346",
journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",
issn = "0899-8256",
publisher = "ELSEVIER ACADEMIC PRESS INC",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Stability and segregation in group formation

AU - Milchtaich, I.

AU - Winter, E.

PY - 2002/2

Y1 - 2002/2

N2 - This paper presents a model of group formation based on the assumption that individuals prefer to associate with people similar to them. It is shown that, in general, if the number of groups that can be formed is bounded, then a stable partition of the society into groups may not exist. (A partition is defined as stable if none of the individuals would prefer be in a different group than the one he is in.) However, if individuals' characteristics are one-dimensional, then a stable partition always exists. We give sufficient conditions for stable partitions to be segregating (in the sense that, for example, low-characteristic individuals are in one group and high-characteristic ones are in another) and Pareto efficient. In addition, we propose a dynamic model of individual myopic behavior describing the evolution of group formation to an eventual stable, segregating, and Pareto efficient partition. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, H41. © 2002 Elsevier Science.

AB - This paper presents a model of group formation based on the assumption that individuals prefer to associate with people similar to them. It is shown that, in general, if the number of groups that can be formed is bounded, then a stable partition of the society into groups may not exist. (A partition is defined as stable if none of the individuals would prefer be in a different group than the one he is in.) However, if individuals' characteristics are one-dimensional, then a stable partition always exists. We give sufficient conditions for stable partitions to be segregating (in the sense that, for example, low-characteristic individuals are in one group and high-characteristic ones are in another) and Pareto efficient. In addition, we propose a dynamic model of individual myopic behavior describing the evolution of group formation to an eventual stable, segregating, and Pareto efficient partition. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, H41. © 2002 Elsevier Science.

KW - Coalition structure

KW - Group formation

KW - Local public goods

KW - Myopic optimization

KW - Segregation

KW - Weak acyclicity

U2 - 10.1006/game.2001.0878

DO - 10.1006/game.2001.0878

M3 - Journal article

VL - 38

SP - 318

EP - 346

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

SN - 0899-8256

IS - 2

ER -