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Stealthy Verification Mechanism to Defend SDN Against Topology Poisoning

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Stealthy Verification Mechanism to Defend SDN Against Topology Poisoning. / Zamin Khan, Bakht; Ghani, Anwar; Khan, Imran et al.
Internet of Things. Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH, 2022. p. 235-246 (Internet of Things).

Research output: Contribution in Book/Report/Proceedings - With ISBN/ISSNChapter

Harvard

Zamin Khan, B, Ghani, A, Khan, I, Ali Khan, M & Bilal, M 2022, Stealthy Verification Mechanism to Defend SDN Against Topology Poisoning. in Internet of Things. Internet of Things, Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH, pp. 235-246. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-89328-6_13

APA

Zamin Khan, B., Ghani, A., Khan, I., Ali Khan, M., & Bilal, M. (2022). Stealthy Verification Mechanism to Defend SDN Against Topology Poisoning. In Internet of Things (pp. 235-246). (Internet of Things). Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-89328-6_13

Vancouver

Zamin Khan B, Ghani A, Khan I, Ali Khan M, Bilal M. Stealthy Verification Mechanism to Defend SDN Against Topology Poisoning. In Internet of Things. Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH. 2022. p. 235-246. (Internet of Things). Epub 2021 Oct 8. doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-89328-6_13

Author

Zamin Khan, Bakht ; Ghani, Anwar ; Khan, Imran et al. / Stealthy Verification Mechanism to Defend SDN Against Topology Poisoning. Internet of Things. Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH, 2022. pp. 235-246 (Internet of Things).

Bibtex

@inbook{f3b371ea33c747f0a1974c26c6efc69d,
title = "Stealthy Verification Mechanism to Defend SDN Against Topology Poisoning",
abstract = "Software-defined network (SDN) is an emerging networking paradigm that segregates functionalities of control and data plane to reduce their complexity and provides more control, scalability, and centralized management. OpenFlow (OF) is a widely used protocol that builds a global and shared view of the network. Therefore, for SDN applications, the correctness of the topology view has a critical impact on the flow-based communication and provision of services. However, recently identified vulnerabilities in Open Flow Discovery Protocol (OFDP) reveal that malicious hosts or data plane switches can poison the global view of the network, and an intruder can launch man-in-the-middle or denial of service attacks. Existing passive approach-based solutions work well for known attacks. Some solutions use an active approach to identify the fake links or malicious hosts by sending Stealthy Probing Verification (SPV) packets. However, due to the use of probing mechanism, it faces scalability and bandwidth consumption issues in the case of large data centers networks and resource limited networks. The proposed technique is based on the SPV mechanism, however, to counter the scalability and bandwidth issues, the probing packets are only initiated when triggered updates of a new link or network node are received by the SDN controller. The probing traffic has been reduced by 40%. Hence consume less bandwidth and identifies a malicious host in less than 90 ms. The results indicate that the Enhance Stealthy Probing Verification (ESPV) is a more scalable and suitable solution to detect and identify fake links or malicious hosts in large data center networks and resource limited networks such as Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs).",
keywords = "Active probing, Link fabrication, Open flow discovery protocol, OpenFlow, Resource constraint networks, Security, Software-defined network, Stealthy probing verification, Topology discovery, Wireless sensor networks",
author = "{Zamin Khan}, Bakht and Anwar Ghani and Imran Khan and {Ali Khan}, Muazzam and Muhammad Bilal",
year = "2022",
month = jan,
day = "15",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-030-89328-6_13",
language = "English",
isbn = "9783030893279",
series = "Internet of Things",
publisher = "Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH",
pages = "235--246",
booktitle = "Internet of Things",
address = "Germany",

}

RIS

TY - CHAP

T1 - Stealthy Verification Mechanism to Defend SDN Against Topology Poisoning

AU - Zamin Khan, Bakht

AU - Ghani, Anwar

AU - Khan, Imran

AU - Ali Khan, Muazzam

AU - Bilal, Muhammad

PY - 2022/1/15

Y1 - 2022/1/15

N2 - Software-defined network (SDN) is an emerging networking paradigm that segregates functionalities of control and data plane to reduce their complexity and provides more control, scalability, and centralized management. OpenFlow (OF) is a widely used protocol that builds a global and shared view of the network. Therefore, for SDN applications, the correctness of the topology view has a critical impact on the flow-based communication and provision of services. However, recently identified vulnerabilities in Open Flow Discovery Protocol (OFDP) reveal that malicious hosts or data plane switches can poison the global view of the network, and an intruder can launch man-in-the-middle or denial of service attacks. Existing passive approach-based solutions work well for known attacks. Some solutions use an active approach to identify the fake links or malicious hosts by sending Stealthy Probing Verification (SPV) packets. However, due to the use of probing mechanism, it faces scalability and bandwidth consumption issues in the case of large data centers networks and resource limited networks. The proposed technique is based on the SPV mechanism, however, to counter the scalability and bandwidth issues, the probing packets are only initiated when triggered updates of a new link or network node are received by the SDN controller. The probing traffic has been reduced by 40%. Hence consume less bandwidth and identifies a malicious host in less than 90 ms. The results indicate that the Enhance Stealthy Probing Verification (ESPV) is a more scalable and suitable solution to detect and identify fake links or malicious hosts in large data center networks and resource limited networks such as Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs).

AB - Software-defined network (SDN) is an emerging networking paradigm that segregates functionalities of control and data plane to reduce their complexity and provides more control, scalability, and centralized management. OpenFlow (OF) is a widely used protocol that builds a global and shared view of the network. Therefore, for SDN applications, the correctness of the topology view has a critical impact on the flow-based communication and provision of services. However, recently identified vulnerabilities in Open Flow Discovery Protocol (OFDP) reveal that malicious hosts or data plane switches can poison the global view of the network, and an intruder can launch man-in-the-middle or denial of service attacks. Existing passive approach-based solutions work well for known attacks. Some solutions use an active approach to identify the fake links or malicious hosts by sending Stealthy Probing Verification (SPV) packets. However, due to the use of probing mechanism, it faces scalability and bandwidth consumption issues in the case of large data centers networks and resource limited networks. The proposed technique is based on the SPV mechanism, however, to counter the scalability and bandwidth issues, the probing packets are only initiated when triggered updates of a new link or network node are received by the SDN controller. The probing traffic has been reduced by 40%. Hence consume less bandwidth and identifies a malicious host in less than 90 ms. The results indicate that the Enhance Stealthy Probing Verification (ESPV) is a more scalable and suitable solution to detect and identify fake links or malicious hosts in large data center networks and resource limited networks such as Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs).

KW - Active probing

KW - Link fabrication

KW - Open flow discovery protocol

KW - OpenFlow

KW - Resource constraint networks

KW - Security

KW - Software-defined network

KW - Stealthy probing verification

KW - Topology discovery

KW - Wireless sensor networks

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-030-89328-6_13

DO - 10.1007/978-3-030-89328-6_13

M3 - Chapter

AN - SCOPUS:85123636445

SN - 9783030893279

T3 - Internet of Things

SP - 235

EP - 246

BT - Internet of Things

PB - Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH

ER -