Rights statement: The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0911-6
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Final published version
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Strategic choice of sharing rules in collective contests
AU - Balart, Pau
AU - Flamand, Sabine
AU - Troumpounis, Orestis
N1 - The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0911-6
PY - 2016/2
Y1 - 2016/2
N2 - Competition between groups often involves prizes that have both a public and a private component. The exact nature of the prize not only affects the strategic choice of the sharing rules determining its allocation but also gives rise to an interesting phenomenon not observed when the prize is either purely public or purely private. Indeed, we show that in the two-groups contest, for most degrees of privateness of the prize, the large group uses its sharing rule as a mean to exclude the small group from the competition, a situation called monopolization. Conversely, there is a degree of relative privateness above which the small group, besides being active, even outperforms the large group in terms of winning probabilities, giving rise to the celebrated group size paradox.
AB - Competition between groups often involves prizes that have both a public and a private component. The exact nature of the prize not only affects the strategic choice of the sharing rules determining its allocation but also gives rise to an interesting phenomenon not observed when the prize is either purely public or purely private. Indeed, we show that in the two-groups contest, for most degrees of privateness of the prize, the large group uses its sharing rule as a mean to exclude the small group from the competition, a situation called monopolization. Conversely, there is a degree of relative privateness above which the small group, besides being active, even outperforms the large group in terms of winning probabilities, giving rise to the celebrated group size paradox.
U2 - 10.1007/s00355-015-0911-6
DO - 10.1007/s00355-015-0911-6
M3 - Journal article
VL - 46
SP - 239
EP - 262
JO - Social Choice and Welfare
JF - Social Choice and Welfare
SN - 0176-1714
IS - 2
ER -