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    Rights statement: This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 92, 2018 DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2017.08.006

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    Available under license: CC BY-NC: Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License

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Strategic decentralization and the provision of global public goods

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

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Strategic decentralization and the provision of global public goods. / Foucart, R.; Wan, C.
In: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 92, 01.11.2018, p. 537-558.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Foucart, R & Wan, C 2018, 'Strategic decentralization and the provision of global public goods', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, vol. 92, pp. 537-558. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2017.08.006

APA

Foucart, R., & Wan, C. (2018). Strategic decentralization and the provision of global public goods. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 92, 537-558. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2017.08.006

Vancouver

Foucart R, Wan C. Strategic decentralization and the provision of global public goods. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. 2018 Nov 1;92:537-558. doi: 10.1016/j.jeem.2017.08.006

Author

Foucart, R. ; Wan, C. / Strategic decentralization and the provision of global public goods. In: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. 2018 ; Vol. 92. pp. 537-558.

Bibtex

@article{9983f945179c43b0aced78d6047e14db,
title = "Strategic decentralization and the provision of global public goods",
abstract = "We study strategic decentralization in the provision of a global public good. A federation, with the aim of maximizing the aggregate utility of its members, may find it advantageous to decentralize the decision-making, so that its members act autonomously to maximize their own utility. If utility is fully transferable within a federation, the larger a federation is or the more sensitive it is to the public good, the more it has incentives to remain centralized. If an overall increase in the sensitivity to the public good induces some federation(s) to decentralize, it may lead to a decrease in the aggregate provision. With non-transferable utility within a federation, those members that are smaller or less sensitive to the public good are more likely to prefer decentralization. Some members within a federation becoming more sensitive to the public good may thus lead to a lower aggregate provision, because the increased heterogeneity of the federation makes it more inclined to decentralize. {\textcopyright} 2017 Elsevier Inc.",
keywords = "Decentralization, Delegation, Global public goods, Decision making, Non-transferable utilities, Public goods, Aggregates, decentralization, decision making, federal system, heterogeneity, public goods, service provision, strategic approach",
author = "R. Foucart and C. Wan",
note = "This is the author{\textquoteright}s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 92, 2018 DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2017.08.006",
year = "2018",
month = nov,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1016/j.jeem.2017.08.006",
language = "English",
volume = "92",
pages = "537--558",
journal = "Journal of Environmental Economics and Management",
issn = "0095-0696",
publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Strategic decentralization and the provision of global public goods

AU - Foucart, R.

AU - Wan, C.

N1 - This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 92, 2018 DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2017.08.006

PY - 2018/11/1

Y1 - 2018/11/1

N2 - We study strategic decentralization in the provision of a global public good. A federation, with the aim of maximizing the aggregate utility of its members, may find it advantageous to decentralize the decision-making, so that its members act autonomously to maximize their own utility. If utility is fully transferable within a federation, the larger a federation is or the more sensitive it is to the public good, the more it has incentives to remain centralized. If an overall increase in the sensitivity to the public good induces some federation(s) to decentralize, it may lead to a decrease in the aggregate provision. With non-transferable utility within a federation, those members that are smaller or less sensitive to the public good are more likely to prefer decentralization. Some members within a federation becoming more sensitive to the public good may thus lead to a lower aggregate provision, because the increased heterogeneity of the federation makes it more inclined to decentralize. © 2017 Elsevier Inc.

AB - We study strategic decentralization in the provision of a global public good. A federation, with the aim of maximizing the aggregate utility of its members, may find it advantageous to decentralize the decision-making, so that its members act autonomously to maximize their own utility. If utility is fully transferable within a federation, the larger a federation is or the more sensitive it is to the public good, the more it has incentives to remain centralized. If an overall increase in the sensitivity to the public good induces some federation(s) to decentralize, it may lead to a decrease in the aggregate provision. With non-transferable utility within a federation, those members that are smaller or less sensitive to the public good are more likely to prefer decentralization. Some members within a federation becoming more sensitive to the public good may thus lead to a lower aggregate provision, because the increased heterogeneity of the federation makes it more inclined to decentralize. © 2017 Elsevier Inc.

KW - Decentralization

KW - Delegation

KW - Global public goods

KW - Decision making

KW - Non-transferable utilities

KW - Public goods

KW - Aggregates

KW - decentralization

KW - decision making

KW - federal system

KW - heterogeneity

KW - public goods

KW - service provision

KW - strategic approach

U2 - 10.1016/j.jeem.2017.08.006

DO - 10.1016/j.jeem.2017.08.006

M3 - Journal article

VL - 92

SP - 537

EP - 558

JO - Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

JF - Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

SN - 0095-0696

ER -