Subjective confidence and the belief bias effect in syllogistic reasoning

Psychology

Keywords

CONCLUSIONS

Research output: Contribution in Book/Report/Proceedings - With ISBN/ISSN › Conference contribution/Paper › peer-review

Published

Standard

Subjective confidence and the belief bias effect in syllogistic reasoning. / Quayle, J D ; Ball, L J .
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual conference of the Cognitive Science Society: August 7-10, 1997, Stanford University, Stanford, CA. ed. / Pat Langley; Michael G. Shafto. MAHWAH: LAWRENCE ERLBAUM ASSOC PUBL, 1997. p. 626-631.

Research output: Contribution in Book/Report/Proceedings - With ISBN/ISSN › Conference contribution/Paper › peer-review

Harvard

Quayle, JD & Ball, LJ 1997, Subjective confidence and the belief bias effect in syllogistic reasoning. in P Langley & MG Shafto (eds), Proceedings of the nineteenth annual conference of the Cognitive Science Society: August 7-10, 1997, Stanford University, Stanford, CA. LAWRENCE ERLBAUM ASSOC PUBL, MAHWAH, pp. 626-631, 19th Annual Conference of the Cognitive-Science-Society, Stanford, 7/08/97.

APA

Quayle, J. D., & Ball, L. J. (1997). Subjective confidence and the belief bias effect in syllogistic reasoning. In P. Langley, & M. G. Shafto (Eds.), Proceedings of the nineteenth annual conference of the Cognitive Science Society: August 7-10, 1997, Stanford University, Stanford, CA (pp. 626-631). LAWRENCE ERLBAUM ASSOC PUBL.

Vancouver

Quayle JD, Ball LJ. Subjective confidence and the belief bias effect in syllogistic reasoning. In Langley P, Shafto MG, editors, Proceedings of the nineteenth annual conference of the Cognitive Science Society: August 7-10, 1997, Stanford University, Stanford, CA. MAHWAH: LAWRENCE ERLBAUM ASSOC PUBL. 1997. p. 626-631

Author

Quayle, J D ; Ball, L J . / Subjective confidence and the belief bias effect in syllogistic reasoning. Proceedings of the nineteenth annual conference of the Cognitive Science Society: August 7-10, 1997, Stanford University, Stanford, CA. editor / Pat Langley ; Michael G. Shafto. MAHWAH : LAWRENCE ERLBAUM ASSOC PUBL, 1997. pp. 626-631

Bibtex

@inproceedings{a15b188fb4e24cbdb629a3cf325088eb,

title = "Subjective confidence and the belief bias effect in syllogistic reasoning",

abstract = "An experiment is reported in which participants were asked to record how confident they felt about the correctness of their responses as they assessed the validity of deductive arguments whose conclusions varied in prior believability. The results showed that participants were more confident of their responses to valid problems than invalid problems irrespective of believability status, providing support for the idea that invalid problems are more demanding to process than valid problems. Effects of belief, logic on conclusion acceptance rates and a logicxbelief interaction are also demonstrated, and evidence is provided to suggest that belief bias principally reflects a tendency to reject unbelievable arguments. A theory is proposed in which belief bias effects are accounted for by the variations in the processing demands of valid and invalid syllogisms.",

keywords = "CONCLUSIONS",

author = "Quayle, {J D} and Ball, {L J}",

year = "1997",

language = "English",

isbn = "0-8058-2941-5",

pages = "626--631",

editor = "Pat Langley and Shafto, {Michael G.}",

booktitle = "Proceedings of the nineteenth annual conference of the Cognitive Science Society: August 7-10, 1997, Stanford University, Stanford, CA",

publisher = "LAWRENCE ERLBAUM ASSOC PUBL",

note = "19th Annual Conference of the Cognitive-Science-Society ; Conference date: 07-08-1997 Through 10-08-1997",

}

RIS

TY - GEN

T1 - Subjective confidence and the belief bias effect in syllogistic reasoning

AU - Quayle, J D

AU - Ball, L J

PY - 1997

Y1 - 1997

N2 - An experiment is reported in which participants were asked to record how confident they felt about the correctness of their responses as they assessed the validity of deductive arguments whose conclusions varied in prior believability. The results showed that participants were more confident of their responses to valid problems than invalid problems irrespective of believability status, providing support for the idea that invalid problems are more demanding to process than valid problems. Effects of belief, logic on conclusion acceptance rates and a logicxbelief interaction are also demonstrated, and evidence is provided to suggest that belief bias principally reflects a tendency to reject unbelievable arguments. A theory is proposed in which belief bias effects are accounted for by the variations in the processing demands of valid and invalid syllogisms.

AB - An experiment is reported in which participants were asked to record how confident they felt about the correctness of their responses as they assessed the validity of deductive arguments whose conclusions varied in prior believability. The results showed that participants were more confident of their responses to valid problems than invalid problems irrespective of believability status, providing support for the idea that invalid problems are more demanding to process than valid problems. Effects of belief, logic on conclusion acceptance rates and a logicxbelief interaction are also demonstrated, and evidence is provided to suggest that belief bias principally reflects a tendency to reject unbelievable arguments. A theory is proposed in which belief bias effects are accounted for by the variations in the processing demands of valid and invalid syllogisms.

KW - CONCLUSIONS

M3 - Conference contribution/Paper

SN - 0-8058-2941-5

SP - 626

EP - 631

BT - Proceedings of the nineteenth annual conference of the Cognitive Science Society: August 7-10, 1997, Stanford University, Stanford, CA

A2 - Langley, Pat

A2 - Shafto, Michael G.

PB - LAWRENCE ERLBAUM ASSOC PUBL

CY - MAHWAH

T2 - 19th Annual Conference of the Cognitive-Science-Society

Y2 - 7 August 1997 through 10 August 1997

ER -

Research

Keywords