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Subscription mechanisms for network formation

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Subscription mechanisms for network formation. / Mutuswami, S.; Winter, E.
In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 106, No. 2, 10.2002, p. 242-264.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Mutuswami, S & Winter, E 2002, 'Subscription mechanisms for network formation', Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 106, no. 2, pp. 242-264. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2920

APA

Mutuswami, S., & Winter, E. (2002). Subscription mechanisms for network formation. Journal of Economic Theory, 106(2), 242-264. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2920

Vancouver

Mutuswami S, Winter E. Subscription mechanisms for network formation. Journal of Economic Theory. 2002 Oct;106(2):242-264. doi: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2920

Author

Mutuswami, S. ; Winter, E. / Subscription mechanisms for network formation. In: Journal of Economic Theory. 2002 ; Vol. 106, No. 2. pp. 242-264.

Bibtex

@article{eb62582489d74b81991ff37e1057a8c3,
title = "Subscription mechanisms for network formation",
abstract = "We analyze a model of network formation where the costs of link formation are publicly known but individual benefits are not known to the social planner. The objective is to design a simple mechanism ensuring efficiency, budget balance, and equity. We propose two mechanisms towards this end; the first ensures efficiency and budget balance but not equity. The second mechanism corrects the asymmetry in payoffs through a two-stage variant of the first mechanism. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C72, D20. {\textcopyright} 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).",
keywords = "Mechanism design, Networks, Shapley value",
author = "S. Mutuswami and E. Winter",
year = "2002",
month = oct,
doi = "10.1006/jeth.2001.2920",
language = "English",
volume = "106",
pages = "242--264",
journal = "Journal of Economic Theory",
issn = "0022-0531",
publisher = "ELSEVIER ACADEMIC PRESS INC",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Subscription mechanisms for network formation

AU - Mutuswami, S.

AU - Winter, E.

PY - 2002/10

Y1 - 2002/10

N2 - We analyze a model of network formation where the costs of link formation are publicly known but individual benefits are not known to the social planner. The objective is to design a simple mechanism ensuring efficiency, budget balance, and equity. We propose two mechanisms towards this end; the first ensures efficiency and budget balance but not equity. The second mechanism corrects the asymmetry in payoffs through a two-stage variant of the first mechanism. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C72, D20. © 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).

AB - We analyze a model of network formation where the costs of link formation are publicly known but individual benefits are not known to the social planner. The objective is to design a simple mechanism ensuring efficiency, budget balance, and equity. We propose two mechanisms towards this end; the first ensures efficiency and budget balance but not equity. The second mechanism corrects the asymmetry in payoffs through a two-stage variant of the first mechanism. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C72, D20. © 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).

KW - Mechanism design

KW - Networks

KW - Shapley value

U2 - 10.1006/jeth.2001.2920

DO - 10.1006/jeth.2001.2920

M3 - Journal article

VL - 106

SP - 242

EP - 264

JO - Journal of Economic Theory

JF - Journal of Economic Theory

SN - 0022-0531

IS - 2

ER -