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Susceptibility analysis of structured P2P systems to localized eclipse attacks

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Susceptibility analysis of structured P2P systems to localized eclipse attacks. / Germanus, D.; Langenberg, R.; Khelil, A. et al.
2012 IEEE 31st Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems. IEEE, 2012. p. 11-20.

Research output: Contribution in Book/Report/Proceedings - With ISBN/ISSNConference contribution/Paperpeer-review

Harvard

Germanus, D, Langenberg, R, Khelil, A & Suri, N 2012, Susceptibility analysis of structured P2P systems to localized eclipse attacks. in 2012 IEEE 31st Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems. IEEE, pp. 11-20. https://doi.org/10.1109/SRDS.2012.70

APA

Germanus, D., Langenberg, R., Khelil, A., & Suri, N. (2012). Susceptibility analysis of structured P2P systems to localized eclipse attacks. In 2012 IEEE 31st Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems (pp. 11-20). IEEE. https://doi.org/10.1109/SRDS.2012.70

Vancouver

Germanus D, Langenberg R, Khelil A, Suri N. Susceptibility analysis of structured P2P systems to localized eclipse attacks. In 2012 IEEE 31st Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems. IEEE. 2012. p. 11-20 doi: 10.1109/SRDS.2012.70

Author

Germanus, D. ; Langenberg, R. ; Khelil, A. et al. / Susceptibility analysis of structured P2P systems to localized eclipse attacks. 2012 IEEE 31st Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems. IEEE, 2012. pp. 11-20

Bibtex

@inproceedings{8fc69673de0f48c0843275b379805a25,
title = "Susceptibility analysis of structured P2P systems to localized eclipse attacks",
abstract = "Peer-to-Peer (P2P) protocols are susceptible to Localized Eclipse Attacks (LEA), i.e., attacks where a victim peer's environment is masked by malicious peers which are then able to instigate progressively insidious security attacks. To obtain effective placement of malicious peers, LEAs significantly benefit from overlay topology-awareness. Hence, we propose heuristics for Chord, Pastry and Kademlia to assess the protocols' LEA susceptibility based on their topology characteristics and overlay routing mechanisms. As a result, our method can be used for P2P protocol parameter tuning in order to substantially mitigate LEAs. We present evaluations highlighting LEA's impact on contemporary P2P protocols. Our proposed heuristics are abstract in nature, making them applicable plus customizable for many other structured P2P protocols. We validate our model's accuracy through a simulation case study. {\textcopyright} 2012 IEEE.",
keywords = "Eclipse Attack, Overlay Topology Analysis, Peer-to-Peer Security, Customizable, Kademlia, Malicious peer, Overlay routing, Overlay topologies, P2P protocols, Peer-to-peer protocols, Peer-to-peer securities, Security attacks, Structured P2P, Structured P2P systems, Susceptibility analysis, Topology characteristics, Topology-awareness, Computer simulation, Distributed computer systems",
author = "D. Germanus and R. Langenberg and A. Khelil and Neeraj Suri",
year = "2012",
month = oct,
day = "8",
doi = "10.1109/SRDS.2012.70",
language = "English",
isbn = "9781467323970",
pages = "11--20",
booktitle = "2012 IEEE 31st Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems",
publisher = "IEEE",

}

RIS

TY - GEN

T1 - Susceptibility analysis of structured P2P systems to localized eclipse attacks

AU - Germanus, D.

AU - Langenberg, R.

AU - Khelil, A.

AU - Suri, Neeraj

PY - 2012/10/8

Y1 - 2012/10/8

N2 - Peer-to-Peer (P2P) protocols are susceptible to Localized Eclipse Attacks (LEA), i.e., attacks where a victim peer's environment is masked by malicious peers which are then able to instigate progressively insidious security attacks. To obtain effective placement of malicious peers, LEAs significantly benefit from overlay topology-awareness. Hence, we propose heuristics for Chord, Pastry and Kademlia to assess the protocols' LEA susceptibility based on their topology characteristics and overlay routing mechanisms. As a result, our method can be used for P2P protocol parameter tuning in order to substantially mitigate LEAs. We present evaluations highlighting LEA's impact on contemporary P2P protocols. Our proposed heuristics are abstract in nature, making them applicable plus customizable for many other structured P2P protocols. We validate our model's accuracy through a simulation case study. © 2012 IEEE.

AB - Peer-to-Peer (P2P) protocols are susceptible to Localized Eclipse Attacks (LEA), i.e., attacks where a victim peer's environment is masked by malicious peers which are then able to instigate progressively insidious security attacks. To obtain effective placement of malicious peers, LEAs significantly benefit from overlay topology-awareness. Hence, we propose heuristics for Chord, Pastry and Kademlia to assess the protocols' LEA susceptibility based on their topology characteristics and overlay routing mechanisms. As a result, our method can be used for P2P protocol parameter tuning in order to substantially mitigate LEAs. We present evaluations highlighting LEA's impact on contemporary P2P protocols. Our proposed heuristics are abstract in nature, making them applicable plus customizable for many other structured P2P protocols. We validate our model's accuracy through a simulation case study. © 2012 IEEE.

KW - Eclipse Attack

KW - Overlay Topology Analysis

KW - Peer-to-Peer Security

KW - Customizable

KW - Kademlia

KW - Malicious peer

KW - Overlay routing

KW - Overlay topologies

KW - P2P protocols

KW - Peer-to-peer protocols

KW - Peer-to-peer securities

KW - Security attacks

KW - Structured P2P

KW - Structured P2P systems

KW - Susceptibility analysis

KW - Topology characteristics

KW - Topology-awareness

KW - Computer simulation

KW - Distributed computer systems

U2 - 10.1109/SRDS.2012.70

DO - 10.1109/SRDS.2012.70

M3 - Conference contribution/Paper

SN - 9781467323970

SP - 11

EP - 20

BT - 2012 IEEE 31st Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems

PB - IEEE

ER -