Final published version, 412 KB, PDF document
Research output: Working paper
Research output: Working paper
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TY - UNPB
T1 - The acceptability of lotteries in allocation problems
T2 - a choice-based approach
AU - Bouacida, Elias
AU - Foucart, Renaud
PY - 2020/7/1
Y1 - 2020/7/1
N2 - We report the results of two experiments on the social acceptability of random devices in allocation mechanisms. A majority of subjects do not opt for a lottery if they can rationalize an alternative mechanism as non-random. It is, however, possible to design a payoff-equivalent mechanism to the lottery that is more acceptable. Our results shed light on the real-world reliance on obscure criteria in allocation problems where lotteries seem to be simpler and more efficient.
AB - We report the results of two experiments on the social acceptability of random devices in allocation mechanisms. A majority of subjects do not opt for a lottery if they can rationalize an alternative mechanism as non-random. It is, however, possible to design a payoff-equivalent mechanism to the lottery that is more acceptable. Our results shed light on the real-world reliance on obscure criteria in allocation problems where lotteries seem to be simpler and more efficient.
KW - lotteries
KW - mechanism design
M3 - Working paper
T3 - Economics Working Papers Series
BT - The acceptability of lotteries in allocation problems
PB - Lancaster University, Department of Economics
CY - Lancaster
ER -